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INTRODUCTION
r'14E most significant occurrence surrounding the adoption of Rule
51 (the "Rule") was the repeal by the Securities and Exchange
1. Rule 145 provides:
(a) Transactions within this section. An "offer, .... offer to sell," "offer for
sale," or "sale" shall be deemed to be involved, within the meaning of section
2(3) of the Act, so far as the security holders of a corporation or other person
are concerned where, pursuant to statutory provisions of the jurisdiction under
which such corporation or other person is organized, or pursuant to provisions
contained in its certificate of incorporation or similar controlling instruments,
or otherwise, there is submitted for the vote or consent of such security holders
a plan or agreement for:
(1) Reclassifications. A reclassification of securities of such corporation or
other person, other than a stock split, reverse stock split, or change in par value,
which involves the substitution of a security for another security;
(2) Mergers or Consolidations. A statutory merger or consolidation or similar
plan or acquisition in which securities of such corporation or other person held
by such security holders will become or be exchanged for securities of any per-
son, unless the sole purpose of the transaction is to change an issuer's domicile
solely within the United States; or
(3) Transfers of assets. A transfer of assets of such corporation or other per-
son, to another person in consideration of the issuance of securities of such
other person or any of its affiliates, if:
(i) Such plan or agreement provides for dissolution of the corporation
or other person whose security holders are voting or consenting; or
(ii) Such plan or agreement provides for a pro rata or similar distribu-
tion of such securities to the security holders voting or consenting; or
(iii) The board of directors or similar representatives of such corpora-
tion or other person, adopts resolutions relative to paragraph (a)(3) (i) or
(ii) of this section within 1 year after the taking of such vote or consent; or
(iv) The transfer of assets is a part of a preexisting plan for distribution
of such securities, notwithstanding paragraph (a)(3) (i), (ii), or (iii) of this
section.
(b) Communications not deemed to be a "Prospectus" or "Offer to Sell".
For the purpose of this section, the term "prospectus" as defined in section
2(10) of the Act and the term "offer to sell" in Section 5 of the Act shall
not be deemed to include the following:
(1) Any written communication or other published statement
which contains no more than the following information: The name of
the issuer of the securities to be offered, or the person whose assets are
to be sold in exchange for the securities to be offered, and the names of
other parties to any transaction specified in paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion; a brief description of the business of parties to such transaction;
the date, time, and place of the meeting of security holders to vote on
or consent to any such transaction specified in paragraph (a) of this
section; a brief description of the transaction to be acted upon and the
basis upon which such transaction will be made; and any legend or
similar statement required by State or Federal law or administrative
authority.
(2) Any written communication subject to and meeting the re-
quirements of paragraph (a) of § 240.14a-12 [Rule 14a-12 under the
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Commission (the "Commission" or the "staff") of Rule 133,2 the con-
Securities Exchange Act of 1934] of this chapter and filed in accord-
ance with paragraph (b) of that section.
(c) Persons and parties deemed to be underwriters. For purposes of this
section, any party to any transaction specified in paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion, other than the issuer, or any person who is an affiliate of such party at
the time any such transaction is submitted for vote or consent, who pub-
licly offers or sells securities of the issuer acquired in connection with any
such transaction, shall be deemed to be engaged in a distribution and there-
fore to be an underwriter thereof within the meaning of section 2(11) of the
Act. The term "party" as used in this paragraph (c) shall mean the corpo-
rations, business entities, or other persons, other than the issuer, whose
assets or capital structure are affected by the transactions specified in para-
graph (a) of this section.
(d) Resale provisions for persons and parties deemed underwriters.
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (c), a person or party speci-
fied therein shall not be deemed to be engaged in a distribution and there-
fore not to be an underwriter of registered securities acquired in a
transaction specified in paragraph (a) of this section if:
(1) Such securites are sold by such person or party in accordance
with the provisions of paragraphs (c), (e), (f) and (g) of § 230.144
[Rule 144];
(2) Such person or party is not an affiliate of the issuer and has
been the beneficial owner of the securities for at least two years as
determined in accordance with paragraph (d) of§ 230.144 [Rule 144],
and the issuer meets the requirements of paragraph (c) of § 230.144
[Rule 144]; or
(3) Such person or party is not, and has been for at least three
months, an affiliate of the issuer and has been the beneficial owner of
the securities for at least three years as determined in accordance with
paragraph (d) of § 230.144 [Rule 144].
(e) Definition of "Person. "The term "person" as used in paragraphs (c)
and (d) of this section, when used with reference to a person for whose
account securities are to be sold, shall have the same meaning as the defini-
tion of that term in paragraph (a)(2) of § 230.144 [Rule 144 under the
Act].
17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1987).
2. Rule 133 provided:
(a) For purposes only of section 5 of the Act, no "sale, .... offer to sell," or
"offer for sale" shall be deemed to be involved so far as the stockholders of a
corporation are concerned where, pursuant to statutory provisions in the state
of incorporation or provisions contained in the certificate of incorporation,
there is submitted to the vote of such stockholders a plan or agreement for a
statutory merger or consolidation or reclassification of securities, or a proposal
for the transfer of assets of such corporation to another person in consideration
of the issuance of securities of such other person or securities of a corporation
which owns stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of such person, under such cir-
cumstances that the vote of a required favorable majority (1) will operate to
authorize the proposed transaction as far as concerns the corporation whose
stockholders are voting (except for the taking of action by the directors of the
corporation involved and for compliance with such statutory provisions as the
filing of the plan or agreement with the appropriate State authority), and (2)
will bind all stockholders of such corporation except to the extent that dissent-
ing shareholders might be entitled, under statutory provisions or provisions
1987]
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contained in the certificate of incorporation, to receive the appraised or fair
value of their holdings.
(b) Any person who purchases securities of the issuer from security holders
of a constituent corporation with a view to, or offers or sells such securities for
such security holders in connection with, a distribution thereof pursuant to any
contract or arrangement, made in connection with any transaction specified in
paragraph (a) of this section, with the issuer or with any affiliate of the issuer, or
with any person who in connection with such transaction is acting as an under-
writer of such securities, shall be deemed to be an underwriter of such securities
within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act. This paragraph does not refer to
arrangements limited to provision for the matching and combination of frac-
tional interests in securities into whole interests, or the purchase and sale of
such fractional interests, among security holders of the constituent corporation
and to the sale on behalf of, and as agent for, such security holders of such
number of fractional or whole interests as may be necessary to adjust for any
remaining fractional interests after such matching.
(c) Any constituent corporation, or any person who is an affiliate of a con-
stituent corporation at the time any transaction specified in paragraph (a) of
this section, is submitted to a vote of the stockholders of such corporation, who
acquires securities of the issuer in connection with such transaction with a view
to the distribution thereof shall be deemed to be an underwriter of such securi-
ties within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act. A transfer by a constituent
corporation to its security holders of securities of the issuer upon a complete or
partial liquidation shall not be deemed a distribution for the purpose of this
paragraph.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (c) of this section, a per-
son specified therein shall not be deemed to be an underwriter nor to be engaged
in a distribution with respect to securities acquired in any transaction specified
in paragraph (a) of this section, which are sold by him in brokers' transactions
within the meaning of section 4(4) of the Act, in accordance with the conditions
and subject to the limitations specified in paragraph (e) of this section, if such
person-
(1) Does not directly or indirectly solicit or arrange for the solicitation
or orders to buy in anticipation of or in connection with such brokers'
transactions;
(2) Makes no payment in connection with the execution of such bro-
kers' transactions to any person other than the broker; and
(3) Limits such brokers' transactions to a sale or series of sales which,
together with all other sales of securities of the same class by such person
or on his behalf within the preceding six months, will not exceed the
following:
(i) If the security is traded only otherwise than on a securities exchange,
approximately one percent of the shares or units of such security outstand-
ing at the time of receipt by the broker of the order to execute such trans-
actions, or
(ii) If the security is admitted to trading on a securities exchange, the
lesser of approximately a one percent of the shares or units of such security
outstanding at the time of receipt by the broker of the order to execute
such transactions or b the largest aggregate reported volume of trading on
securities exchanges during any one week within the four calendar weeks
preceding the receipt of such order.
(e) For the purposes of paragraph (d) of this section:
(1) The term "brokers' transactions" in section 4(4) of the Act shall be
deemed to include transactions by a broker acting as agent for the account
of the seller where (i) the broker performs no more than the usual and
customary broker's functions, (ii) the broker does no more that execute an
order or orders to sell as a broker and receives no more than the usual or
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ceptually deficient "no-sale" rule3 that had perplexed commentators for
years. In Rule 133, the Commission took the position that no offer or
sale of a security was involved when, for example, a shareholder of a
company to be acquired in a merger (an "acquired company") 4 voted
whether to authorize the merger of the acquired company into an acquir-
ing company (an "acquiring company")5 in exchange for stock in the
acquiring company.
It is clear, however, that shareholders of an acquired company make
significant investment decisions when they vote on such a merger, and, as
a result, it may be appropriate to subject such transactions to the disclo-
sure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act").6 With-
out disclosure, the shareholders of the acquired company are unable to
determine whether the proposed merger and the proffered stock in the
acquiring company constitute a fair deal.7
Although the Commission could have concluded its work by merely
customary broker's commissions, (iii) the broker does not solicit or arrange
for the solicitation of orders to buy in anticipation of or in connection with
such transactions and (iv) the broker is not aware of any circumstances
indicating that his principal is failing to comply with the provisions of par-
agraph (d) of this section;
(2) The term "solicitation of such orders" in section 4(4) of the Act
shall be deemed to include the solicitation of an order to buy a security, but
shall not be deemed to include the solicitation of an order to sell a security;
(3) Where within the previous 60 days a dealer has made a written bid
for a security or a written solicitation of an offer to sell such security, the
term "solicitation" in section 4(4) shall not be deemed to include an in-
quiry regarding the dealer's bid or solicitation.
(f) For the purposes of this rule, the term "constituent corporation" means
any corporation, other than the issuer, which is a party to any transaction speci-
fied in paragraph (a) of this section. The term "affiliate" means a person con-
trolling, controlled by or under common control with a specified person.
17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1971), rescinded 37 Fed. Reg. 23, 636 (1972).
3. For a description of Rule 133, its history and defects, see 1 L. Loss, Securities
Regulation 518-42 (2d ed. 1961).
4. For purposes of this Article, the term "acquired company" refers to a non-surviv-
ing entity in a merger or consolidation or an entity that sells its assets in exchange for the
stock of another party.
5. For purposes of this Article, the term "acquiring company" refers to the surviv-
ing entity in a merger or consolidation, an entity that purchases the assets of another
entity or an entity that exchanges its securities with its existing security holders.
6. There exists a body of scholarship that rejects the need for governmentally im-
posed disclosure rules. See, eg., R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 332 (2d ed. 1977).
While this scholarship may be persuasive, this Author has elected not to discuss such
matters in this Article. Instead, it is written from the premise, arguendo, that it is appro-
priate to force disclosure, but that such rules should be reasonable, clearly promulgated
and consistently applied.
7. There are governmental rules that may require disclosure in certain amalgama-
tions and recapitalizations. For example, when an acquired company that is registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") solicits proxies in connection
with a merger, a proxy statement must be provided to the shareholders. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-3 (1987). The federal proxy rules would not be applicable, however, if the
acquired company were not reporting under the 1934 Act.
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repealing Rule 133,8 it chose, instead, to enact a series of special provi-
sions regarding amalgamations and recapitalizations and, therefore,
promulgated Rule 145. Section (a) of Rule 145 provides that an "offer"
and a "sale" of securities is involved when shareholders vote on certain
amalgamations and recapitalizations, provided the shareholders are to
receive new securities under the plan ("Rule 145 transactions").9 Section
(b) of Rule 145 permits certain announcements of a proposed Rule 145
transaction without the announcement's being deemed to constitute an
offer.1° Section (c) defines certain persons participating in a Rule 145
transaction as "underwriters" ("Rule 145 underwriters")," and section
(d) of the Rule provides special resale provisions for these Rule 145
underwriters.12
Since the adoption of Rule 145, the Commission has promulgated one
major interpretative release' 3 and nearly seven hundred no-action letters
on the Rule. In the interpretative release and no-action letters, the Com-
mission has faced, as one would imagine, numerous and difficult issues.
Unfortunately, the Commission has not always responded in a consistent
and logical manner. As a result, the Rule, as interpreted, is unnecessarily
complex and confusing, and in certain aspects conceptually flawed.
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, the Article presents an
analysis of the present status of Rule 145 as it developed through the
Commission's nearly seven hundred no-action letters. Part I analyzes
how the Rule is applied to various types of transactions by issuers, and
Part II analyzes the effect that Rule 145 has on resales of stock originally
acquired in a transaction that fell within Rule 145. In both parts the
Article suggests alternatives where interpretations of the Rule are confus-
ing, inappropriate or nonexistent. In conclusion, the Article discusses
broader policy matters and suggests certain changes that the Commission
should make regarding the text and development of Rule 145.
I. SALES AND NO-SALES BY ISSUERS
A. Generally
A continuing source of interpretative difficulty for the Commission is the
question of when corporate amalgamations and recapitalizations involve
8. Since Rule 133 provided an exception for certain securities from registration
under the 1933 Act, see supra note 2, repeal of the Rule would subject those securities to
the registration requirements.
9. For the text of Rule 145(a), see supra note 1.
10. For the text of Rule 145(b), see supra note 1.
11. For the text of Rule 145(c), see supra note 1.
12. For the text of Rule 145(d), see supra note 1.
13. Division of Corporation Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related Mat-
ters, Securities Act Release No. 5463, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 3058, at 3067-3 (Feb.
28, 1974). Resale of Restricted and Other Securities, Interpretations of Rules, Release
No. 33-6099, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 2705H, at 2819-3 (Aug. 2, 1979) also ad-
dressed some Rule 145 problems.
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an "offer" 14 or a "sale"' 5 of securities (for simplicity, this will often be
referred to only in terms of whether a sale is involved in a Rule 145
transaction). This is a critical decision of course, because if the transac-
tion involves no sale, it is not subject to the disclosure requirements of
the 1933 Act.
Under the provisions of Rule 145(a), the acquiring company makes an
offer and sale of its securities to the shareholders of the acquired com-
pany when the acquired company shareholders vote on a plan for
merger, consolidation' 6 or the sale of assets" under the terms of which
they are to receive securities of the acquiring company. Also, under Rule
145(a), single company recapitalizations involve the offer and sale of se-
curities to voting shareholders who receive the "substitution of a security
for another security."' 8
In each of the foregoing situations, shareholders typically make mate-
rial investment decisions, deciding in the case of single company recapi-
talizations whether to accept changes in the contractual rights they
enjoy, and deciding in the case of mergers, consolidations and sales of
assets whether to accept new contractual rights and new assets against
which they will have claims. The Commission, therefore, properly con-
14. The 1933 Act defines an "offer" as "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solici-
tation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(3) (1982).
15. The 1933 Act defines a "sale" as "every contract of sale or disposition of a secur-
ity or interest in a security, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 7T(3) (1982).
16. Rule 145(a)(2) covers mergers and consolidations. For the text of Rule 145(a)(2),
see supra note 1.
Courts consistently have held that mergers involve the sale of securities. See e.g., SEC
v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 415
F.2d 1326, 1330 (7th Cir. 1969); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir. 1968);
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1967); Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 103-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Simon v. New Haven Bd. &
Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Conn. 1966); H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F.
Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
17. Rule 145(a)(3) covers sales of assets. For the text of Rule 145(a)(3), see supra
note 1.
18. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(1) (1987). For the text of Rule 145(a)(1), see supra note I.
Typically, these transactions are accomplished by amendments to the company's arti-
cles of incorporation. Such changes are specifically authorized by state corporate laws.
See, e.g., Model Business Corp. Act § 58 and state statutes adopting § 58 cited in f' 6
thereafter (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1973 & 1977); see also 3 Model Business Corp. Act
Annotated § 10.01 and state statutes cited thereafter (3d ed. 1987). For examples of cases
in which the rights of preferred shareholders were altered by amendments to a company's
articles of incorporation, see Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418, 419 (D.
Del.), aff'd, 145 F.2d 700 (1944); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198,
199 (D. Del.), aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403
Ill. 260, 264, 85 N.E.2d 722, 724 (1949); State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298,
1304, 31 N.W.2d 853, 856 (1948), cerL denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Franzblau v. Capital
Sec. Co., 2 N.J. Super. 517, 522, 64 A.2d 644, 645-46 (Ch. Div. 1949); Wessel v. Guanta-
namo Sugar Co., 134 N.J. Eq. 271, 272, 35 A.2d 215, 216 (N.J. Ch.), aff'd, 135 NJ. Eq.
506, 39 A.2d 431 (1944) (per curiam); Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 NJ. Eq. 214,
215, 31 A.2d 200, 201 (N.J. Ch. 1943), aff'd, 134 N.J. Eq. 359, 35 A.2d 894 (NJ. Ch.
1944) (per curiam).
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cluded that these four types of transactions should be considered as offers
and sales of securities to the shareholders of the acquired company and
thus should be subjected to the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act.
B. Specific Transactions and Issues
1. Generally
The apparent clarity of Rule 145(a),19 which defines transactions fall-
ing within the Rule, is entirely deceiving, however, because not all reclas-
sifications, mergers, consolidations or sales of assets involve the sale of
securities. The test should be whether the voting shareholders, who are
asked to approve the proposed amalgamation or recapitalization and are
to receive securities in the deal, are making a material investment deci-
sion. When the voting shareholders make a material investment deci-
sion, they need the protection of the 1933 Act, and, accordingly, the
transaction should be considered a sale of securities to the voting share-
holders. The Commission, however, has had difficulty implementing this
concept.
2. Stock Splits
Rule 145(a) exempts reclassifications in the form of a "stock split, re-
verse stock split, or change in par value"2 from the definition of "sale."
Apparently, the Commission considers these transactions to involve only
immaterial changes in the investment contracts of the shareholders and
not, therefore, an appropriate point to require disclosure.
In one instance, however, a reverse stock split may involve a material
change in the rights of shareholders, making it unwise to assume that no
sale is involved. The particular transaction involves the use of a reverse
stock split to freeze out small or minority shareholders. For example,
shareholders may be asked to approve a reverse stock split of significant
proportions, under the terms of which shareholders who would receive
less than one share are relegated to cash in lieu of a fractional share.2I
In such transactions, voting shareholders who are relegated to cash
present no registration problem for the company under the 1933 Act be-
cause they are not purchasing any securities from the company. 22 Share-
holders who receive stock in that transaction, however, may pose 1933
Act problems for the company, because, arguably at least, they are vot-
19. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (1987). For the text of Rule 145(a), see supra note 1.
20. For the text of Rule 145(a)(1), see supra note 1.
21. Under the provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, a corporation is
authorized to pay cash to shareholders in lieu of issuing fractional shares that such share-
holders may otherwise be entitled to receive. See Model Business Corp. Act § 24 (2d ed.
1971).
22. Such shareholders, however, would be selling their securities and thus be pro-
tected by the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982) (Section 10b of the 1934 Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) (promulgated under
§ 10b of the 1934 Act).
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ing to receive a materially changed investment contract.2 Specifically,
the shareholders remaining after the transaction will have a greater inter-
est in the company, which changes their rights of control and rights to
participate in dividends and liquidation. The company also could have a
dramatically changed balance sheet, as the company must either decrease
assets or increase liabilities in order to pay for the freeze-out, and it may
no longer be subject to reporting requirements under the 1934 Act.24
Voting on such a proposed reverse stock split might, therefore, involve
a material investment decision for the shareholders who receive stock in
the transaction. Accordingly, one should be wary of concluding that re-
verse stock splits, which clearly come within the letter of the exception of
Rule 145(a)(1), necessarily involve no sale of a security.
3. Change-in-Domicile Exception
Under Rule 145(a)(2),25 the merger of an acquired company into the
acquiring company, under the terms of which the shareholders of the
acquired company receive stock of the acquiring company (a "stock-for-
stock merger") involves no sale of securities to the shareholders of the
acquired company, if "the sole purpose of the transaction is to change
the issuer's domicile solely within the United States."26 If, therefore, the
merger meets the "sole purpose" criterion, it may be completed without
registration or the need to qualify for an exemption from the registration
provisions of the 1933 Act.27
The availability of the change-in-domicile exception depends upon the
absence of any material change in shareholder rights. Thus, if the
merger has no material effect on the shareholders, the Commission seems
inclined to allow the use of the exception, at times even if the technical
requirements of the exception are not met. If, on the other hand, the
merger that causes a change in a corporation's domicile also materially
changes the bundle of rights that shareholders enjoyed prior to the
merger, the Commission seems to conclude that the merger is not for the
23. For a discussion of alterations of shareholders' contracts as sales, see infra notes
50-68 and accompanying text
24. Section 12(g)(1) of the 1934 Act subjects companies with at least 500 shareholders
and $1,000,000 in assets to the 1934 Act disclosure requirements. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(g)(1) (1982). Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the Commission changed the
threshold amount of assets required to $5 million. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1987).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(2) (1987).
26. Id. For the text of Rule 145(a)(2) and the change-in-domicile exception con-
tained therein, see supra note 1.
In a typical change-in-domicile merger, an operating company incorporated, for exam-
ple, in California, forms a wholly-owned subsidiary in another state, such as Delaware.
The operating company is then merged into the subsidiary, and the shareholders of the
operating company receive shares of the subsidiary. See, e.g., H.F. Ahmanson & Com-
pany, SEC No-Action Letter (available May 9, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file).
27. See, eg., Caterpillar Tractor Co., SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 10, 1986)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (available Mar. 11, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
1987]
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"sole purpose" of changing the corporation's domicile, and the change-
in-domicile exception is unavailable.
Any change-in-domicile merger undoubtedly affects the rights of
shareholders, at least to some extent, by the change in the applicable
state law. The law of the new domicile may, for example, differ from
that of the old domicile with regard to the distribution of control between
shareholders and directors, dissenters' rights, cumulative voting or in-
demnification rights for officers and directors.28 In addition, a number of
companies have used the change-in-domicile merger to add antitakeover
amendments to the company's articles of incorporation. These have in-
cluded, for example, supermajority provisions, anti-greenmai 29 provi-
sions and provisions limiting the right to call special shareholders'
meetings.30
The Commission, under the change-in-domicile exception, generally
has permitted these types of changes in shareholders' rights, 3  even
though the combined effects of the new law and the new antitakeover
provisions arguably materially alter the rights of the shareholders. Per-
mitting these changes seems to be based on the rather practical rationale
that the changes could, in any event, be effected without registration by a
two-step process. First, the corporation could change its domicile with-
out making any changes in its articles of incorporation. This would be
exempt under the change-in-domicile exception. Then, after the dust has
settled, the corporation could amend its new articles of incorporation to
add the new provisions, a step that would not involve a sale of a secur-
28. See, e.g., H.F. Ahmanson & Company, SEC No-Action Letter (available May 9,
1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
29. The most common definition of greenmail is a corporation's repurchase of its
shares from a hostile bidder or shareholder as a way to end a threat to management's
control of the corporation. Normally the repurchase involves a significant block of stock,
at a premium over the market price which is not available to the other shareholders. See,
e.g., Pin v. Texaco, 793 F.2d 1448, 1448-49 (5th Cir. 1986) (greenmail entails buying a
large block of shares in the open market then threatening management with a tender offer
for control of the company, with management responding by buying-out the greenmailer
at a premium); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 n.13 (Del. 1985)
("'greenmail' refers to the practice of buying out a takeover bidder's stock at a premium
that is not available to other shareholders in order to prevent the takeover"); Note,
Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-Entrenchment Hypothesis,
98 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1045 & nn.2 & 3 (1985) ("when an investor purchases more than
5% of the stock of a target company ... the target's directors may then offer to repur-
chase the investor's shares at a premium above the market price").
30. See, e.g., H.F. Ahmanson & Company, SEC No-Action Letter (available May 9,
1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
31. Id. (no enforcement action despite change in shareholders' rights including right
to change number of directors); see also Caterpillar Tractor Co., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Feb. 19, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (same); American Bldg.
Maintenance Indus., SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 11, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, NoAct file) (same); RLI Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 3, 1984)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (no enforcement action despite changes in share-
holders' rights including appraisal rights).
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ity.32 By permitting the two steps to be combined into a single transac-
tion exempt under the change-in-domicile exception, the Commission
has eliminated the need for expensive and needless corporate
procedures. 33
The Commission has, in certain instances, allowed issuers to rely on
the change-in-domicile exception even though the proposed transaction
technically did not fit within its terms. For example, the staff has al-
lowed companies to rely on the change-in-domicile exception when there
was in fact no change in the issuer's state of incorporation or organiza-
tion. In the Massachusetts Financial Development Fund, Inc. no-action
letter,34 the Commission allowed five Massachusetts corporations operat-
ing as investment companies to reorganize as a Massachusetts business
trust pursuant to the change-in-domicile exception. The W. T. Rose En-
terprises, Inc no-action letter 5 involved a statutory merger into a
wholly-owned subsidiary located in the same state as the parent. The
staff raised no objection to this transaction, apparently because the
merger would have qualified for the change-in-domicile exemption if the
surviving subsidiary corporation had been in a different state.3 6
The Commission has also stretched the change-in-domicile exception
to accommodate foreign companies. Specifically, the staff has permitted
corporations incorporated in Canadian jurisdictions to rely upon the
change-in-domicile exception to change their incorporation to other Ca-
nadian jurisdictions,37 even though Rule 145(a)(2) describes the excepted
change-in-domicile transaction as one that is "solely within the United
States.",38
The use of the exemption by foreign companies, however, seems to be
limited to changes between Canadian jurisdictions. In the MSR Explora-
32. One should not conclude, however, that all amendments to a corporation's arti-
cles of incorporation fall outside the definition of a sale. See infra text accompanying
notes 50-68.
33. Eppler, Rule 145 in Practice, Fifth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, at
332 (1973) (comments by Levenson).
34. Massachusetts Fin. Dev. Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Jan. 10, 1985)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file). Similar results can be found in the following letters.
See Meschaert Capital Accumulation Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 21,
1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Scudder Common Stock Fund, SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (available Oct. 10, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Colonial Op-
tion Income Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 31, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, NoAct file).
35. W.T. Rose Enter., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 30, 1981) (LEXIS, Fed-
sec library, NoAct file).
36. Id. In its inquiry letter, W.T. Rose stressed that after the merger the sharehold-
ers would own the same assets in the same proportions. See id. (Inquiry-l). For a similar
result involving corporations from a single state, see Vermont Research Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (available Oct. 30, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
37. United Siscoe Mines Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 14, 1980)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Canadian Merrill, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Jan. 16, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
38. For the text of Rule 145(a)(2), see supra note 1.
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tion, Ltd. no-action letter 9 for example, the staff denied a no-action re-
quest to a proposed change-in-domicile from Alberta, Canada to
Wyoming, concluding that the change-in-domicile exception should not
be available because the transaction involved a "significant corporate re-
organization resulting from a change in domicile from one country to
another .... ,,4 It should not be surprising, then, that the staff denied
the availability of the change-in-domicile exception to a Delaware corpo-
ration that proposed to reincorporate in the Cayman Islands.41 In that
letter, the staff stated that it "draws a sharp distinction between changes
of domicile effected entirely within the United States or North America
and those involving change from within the United States to a totally
foreign domicile." 42
Considered together, the no-action letters described in this section sug-
gest that the availability of the change-in-domicile exception depends
upon the significance of the changes in shareholders' rights. Thus the
Commission is unwilling to extend the change-in-domicile exception to
transactions that materially change the rights of the shareholders in-
volved, such as when the transactions would result in the applicability of
laws of a foreign country. On the other hand, the Commission seems
willing to stretch the exception to include other transactions not techni-
cally within the rule, such as transactions that are purely intrastate or
among jurisdictions in Canada, presumably because the similarity in the
applicable laws results in no material change in shareholders' rights.
4. Changes in Issuer's Form of Entity
The Commission has faced similar issues when companies have tried
to rely on the change-in-domicile exception to alter the form of entity of
the business. The Commission, however, has not dealt with these situa-
tions consistently.
The most typical situation has involved a change by an investment
company from a corporate form to a Massachusetts business trust.4 3 In
such situations, the staff consistently has issued no-action letters, appar-
ently concluding that such changes fit within the letter or at least spirit of
the change-in-domicile exception.' The Commission, however, has indi-
39. MSR Exploration, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 30, 1982) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file).
40. Id.
41. Apco Argentina, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 12, 1979) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., G.T. Pacific Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 25, 1985)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (staff refused to respond to the inquiry); Lowry Mar-
ket Timing Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 8, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
NoAct file) (change by a Texas corporation operating as an investment company to a
Massachusetts business trust); Frank Russell Investment Co., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Dec. 3, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (an investment company
changed from a Maryland corporation to a Massachusetts business trust).
44. See, e.g., Lowry Market Timing Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 8,
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cated on at least two occasions that a change from a business trust to a
corporation involves a sale and thus is not exempt from the registration
requirements.45
Similarly, under the change-in-domicile exception, the staff has al-
lowed investment companies operating as limited partnerships to change
to a Massachusetts business trust" or to change to corporate form.47 It,
however, refused a no-action request for the reorganization of a coopera-
tive as a corporation48 and a mutual insurance company as a
corporation.49
These responses obviously are difficult or, perhaps, impossible to rec-
oncile. The Commission has not indicated why it treats a limited part-
nership differently than a cooperative or a mutual insurance company.
Nor has it indicated why a change to a Massachusetts business trust dif-
fers from a changefrom such a trust. The analysis here, however, should
be the same as that described above. Specifically, if the change in the
company's form of entity results in material alterations in the rights of
the entity's owners, the transaction should be classified as a sale, since
shareholders voting on such transactions need the disclosure required by
the 1933 Act. In judging materiality, the Commission (or other deci-
sionmaker) should weigh carefully matters such as changes in distribu-
tion of control, rights to share in the profits of the enterprise, limited
liability and tax treatment. These are significant elements of ownership
that may change when the form of the business entity is altered, and one
1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Frank Russell Investment Co., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (available Dec. 3, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
Recently, the staff indicated an unwillingness to continue to issue no-action letters for
reorganizations of corporate investment companies into Massachusetts business trusts,
but this indication clearly was only a matter of administrative economy and reflected no
change in policy. In G.T. Pacific Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 25, 1985)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file), the staff stated:
The staff, on a number of occasions, has stated its views with respect to the
conditions under which an investment company may reorganize to change its
domicile or legal form, or both.... Having stated our views, we will no longer
respond to letters in this area unless they present novel or unusual issues.
Id. (citations omitted).
45. See Division of Corporation Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related
Matters, Securities Act Release No. 5463, Part II, Illustration C, Question C-I, 1 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 3058, at p. 3067-6 (Feb. 28, 1974). Similarly, in Mission Invest-
ment Trust, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 2, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
NoAct file), an investment company wanted to change from a California business trust to
a California corporation. The Commission refused to grant no-action, stating that the
change-in-domicile exception "cannot be expanded to include changes in organizational
form." Id.
46. See Fidelity Exchange Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 23, 1984)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
47. See Kemper Municipal Bond Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 22,
1976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
48. See Rochester Drug Coop., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 5, 1973)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
49. See Home Farmers Mutual Ins. Ass'n, SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 5,
1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
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should assume that a material change in any of these elements raises the
risk of the transaction's being deemed a sale. Unfortunately, the Com-
mission has offered little help regarding the absolute or relative impor-
tance of such elements.
5. Changes in Shareholders' Rights
Transactions that alter the rights of shareholders, of course, are not
limited to situations involving a change-in-domicile merger. For exam-
ple, shareholders can amend a corporation's articles of incorporation to
authorize additional shares of stock, add antitakeover provisions, in-
crease the number of directors or change the dividend, redemption, con-
version, voting, liquidation or other rights of shareholders.
The Commission enacted Rule 145(a)(1)50 as a guide for determining
whether at least some of the foregoing transactions constitute sales under
the federal securities laws. The Rule includes in the definition of a sale a
"reclassification of securities of such corporation..., which involves the
substitution of a security for another security . ". .."" Although neither
the term "reclassification" nor the term "substitution" is defined, the
provision seems to be designed to include in the definition of sale only
reclassifications that involve material alterations in the rights of share-
holders. If, therefore, an amendment to a company's articles of incorpo-
ration results only in an immaterial change in shareholders' rights, the
transaction should not be considered a "substitution of a security" within
the meaning of Rule 145(a)(1).
This is the same analysis suggested above as appropriate for determin-
ing the availability of the change-in-domicile exception. 2 Accordingly,
the Commission's no-action responses interpreting the change-in-domi-
cile exception should be applicable to a recapitalization accomplished by
an amendment to a company's articles of incorporation. Thus, for exam-
ple, amending a company's articles of incorporation to add antitakeover
provisions 53 or to change cumulative voting rights- 4 should not be con-
sidered by the Commission to involve a sale of a security, since those
changes would not involve a sale if accomplished in a change-in-domicile
merger.
When, however, the individual contractual rights of shareholders are
changed by a corporate vote, the Commission is likely to conclude that a
sale is involved. The Commission indicated, for example, that a sale
would occur when shareholders vote to extend voting rights to a previ-
50. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(1) (1987).
51. Id. For the text of rule 145(a)(1), see supra note 1.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 25-42.
53. See H.F. Ahmanson & Company, SEC No-Action Letter (available May 9, 1985)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
54. See id. (unlike the law of the current domicile, cumulative voting would not be
mandatory in the new domicile).
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ously non-voting class of securities.-5  This change in the allocation of
control of the corporation seems to be the type of fundamental change in
the shareholders' investment contract that the Commission views as ne-
cessitating the protection of the securities laws.56 Similarly, material
amendments to a company's articles of incorporation affecting other fun-
damental contractual rights of shareholders, such as dividend rights, liq-
uidation rights, redemption rights, conversion features or elimination of
arrearages, also should be deemed to involve the sale of a new security.
The Commission should apply the same analysis and reach the same
result if the reclassification is effected by a merger rather than by an
amendment to the company's articles. Assume, for example, that Alpha
Co. is merged into Beta Co., a corporation with no assets, and that the
Alpha shareholders receive new Beta shares in the transaction. If the
new Beta shares vary only immaterially from the Alpha shares, no sale
should be involved with regard to the Alpha shareholders, even though
the transaction seems to fit into the definition of a sale under the merger
provision of Rule 145(a)(2).57 When shareholders vote on such immate-
rial changes in their bundle of rights, no sale of securities results regard-
less of the deal's structure, and thus there is no need to subject the
transaction to the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act.
Courts also have decided a number of cases involving the question of
whether changes in shareholders' rights constitute sales of securities.5"
Generally, the judiciary has concluded that a sale occurs if, as one judge
stated, there is "a substantial modification of an investment contract cre-
ating fresh rights and obligations."59 An illustrative decision is Ahern v.
Gaussoin," a case in which noteholders exchanged notes of a not-for-
profit corporation for notes in the corporation after it reorganized as a
55. See First Pyramid Ins. Co. of Am., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 3,
1976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); see also Trans World Corp.: Trans World
Airlines, SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 9, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file) (staff stating that it "does not necessarily agree" with the company's assertion that
Rule 145 does not apply to such an amendment, but declining to take enforcement action
because another exemption from registration was available regardless of the applicability
of Rule 145).
56. But see Providence and Worcester Company, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Aug. 20, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (Commission found no sale to be
involved where shareholders voted to change disproportionate voting rights to propor-
tionate voting rights).
57. Cf. W.T. Rose Enter., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 30, 1981) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct fie) (Commission found no sale involved when company merged
with a wholly-owned subsidiary).
58. See, e.g., United States v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 276 F.2d 525 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 961 (1960); SEC v. Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 99 F.2d 795
(2d Ci. 1938) (involving a similar question under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1977)); Western Air Lines v. Sobieski, 191 Cal.
App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961) (change in voting rights of shareholders attempted
by corporation deemed a sale under Cal. Corp. Code § 25009 (currently at CaL Corp.
Code § 25017 (West Supp. 1988))).
59. Igenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
60. 611 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Ore. 1985).
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profit entity. In the reorganization, the noteholders' rights were changed
to provide for an interest rate to be determined from time to time, a
principal payable upon demand and collateral to secure the obligations.
The trial judge characterized this as a "close question" but concluded
that a sale was involved. 1
Although the courts in In re Penn Central Securities Litigation 62 and
Ahern v. Gaussoin reached different results, they applied the same princi-
ple. In Penn Central, the district court found no sale even though the
plaintiffs claimed that the recapitalization changed their preemptive
rights, cumulative voting rights and the par value of their stock. The
court characterized the transaction as "internal corporate action" that
did not rise to the level of a sale.63 On appeal to the Third Circuit, the
plaintiffs changed the thrust of their claims, arguing that the reorganiza-
tion altered their appraisal rights, interfered with their ability to inter-
vene in the company's bankruptcy proceedings and allowed the company
to engage in new types of diversification.' 4 Still, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that no sale was involved.6
There are other cases, however, with results that seem more question-
able, although they are not necessarily theoretically inconsistent with the
analysis offered here. In two of these cases, Watts v. Des Moines Register
and Tribune66 and McCloskey v. McCloskey,67 separate courts reached
the conclusion that an exchange by shareholders of stock for shares in a
voting trust that was to run for a period of ten years did not constitute a
sale of a security.68 Both decisions relied heavily on the fact that only the
voting rights of the shareholders were affected temporarily by the ex-
change and all other shareholders' rights remained intact.
69
In a third case, Broad v. Rockwell International Corporation,70 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that no sale was involved
where debentureholders' right to convert to common stock was altered to
allow the debentureholders the right to convert to cash. The court stated
that it did "not feel that the [alteration in the conversion right to create a
cash-out option], so. .. 'substantially changed' the underlying security
that it produce[d] a . . .sale . ,, " The principle applied in Watts,
McCloskey and Broad seems to be the same as the principle applied in the
other cases cited herein.72 As a result, and in order to support their con-
61. See id. at 1478-79.
62. 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974).
63. Id. at 1337-38.
64. See 494 F.2d 528, 535-39 (3d Cir. 1974).
65. See id. at 539.
66. 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
67. 450 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
68. See Watts, 525 F. Supp. at 1320; McCloskey, 450 F. Supp at 995.
69. See Watts, 525 F. Supp. at 1320; McCloskey, 450 F. Supp. at 995.
70. 614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
71. See id. at 438.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65 and cases cited and discussed therein.
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clusions that the changes involved no sales of securities, the courts in
Watts, McClosky, and Broad undertook to demonstrate the insignificance
of the changes in the investors' rights.73 This Author, however, is uncon-
vinced by the courts' analysis. Such changes in voting and conversion
rights are material to shareholders, who need disclosure in order to de-
cide whether to approve the alteration in their rights.
Notwithstanding some uncertainty in application,74 both the courts
and the Commission seem willing to find a sale when the rights of share-
holders are altered materially.75 Consequently, a sale is more likely to be
found in instances in which important contractual rights of the share-
holders are directly affected, such as material alterations in the rights to
dividends, liquidation, redemption, conversion, arrearages or voting. On
the other hand, consistent with the proffered analysis, both courts and
the Commission seem less likely to find sales where alterations affect cor-
porate governance or other matters that have a more general impact on
the corporation as a whole, such as when shareholders vote to expand the
corporate business into new areas, to eliminate or to adopt cumulative
voting provisions or antitakeover measures including supermajority pro-
visions, provisions for classified boards, and limitations on the rights to
call meetings and remove directors.
6. Changes in Organizational Structure
Since the promulgation of Rule 145, the Commission has included in
the definition of "sale" transactions that result in what the Commission
considers to be "significant changes in the issuer's basic organizational
structure."76 The most prevalent type of such transaction faced by the
Commission has been the change in the ownership configuration of a cor-
poration from a single company to a holding company.'
In a typical situation, the operating company causes the formation of a
73. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
74. Professor Loss has stated:
[A] change in interest or dividend rate or liquidation preference or underlying
security, or a change in the identity of the issuer, would seem quite clearly to
result in a new security. On the other hand, there is likely to be agreement that
a mere change in the name of the security (perhaps from common to Class B
stock), or a change in the name of the issuer without a change of identity, or
certain types of charter amendment affecting the powers of the directors, do not
make a new security. In between come a great variety of other changes-for
example, from par to no par or vice versa, changes in par or stated value,
changes in redemption or cumulative or conversion features, various changes in
voting rights. There the answer must depend on the context ....
L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 264 (1983).
75. For a discussion of alterations of shareholders' rights, see Campbell, Voluntary
Recapitalizations, Fairness, and Rule lOb-5: Life Along the Trail of Santa Fe, 66 Ky. LJ.
267, 267-71 (1977).
76. Division of Corporation Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related Mat-
ters, Securities Act Release No. 5463, Part II, Illustration D, 1 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
3058, at 3067-6 (Feb. 28, 1974).
77. These transactions have been most prevalent in the banking industry, where
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holding company with a subsidiary. Initially, the holding company and
the subsidiary are capitalized only nominally and, in fact, are mere vehi-
cles for the facilitation of the change to a holding company configuration.
A merger subsequently is effected between the old operating company
and the newly formed subsidiary, as a part of which the shareholders of
the operating company exchange their stock for stock in the new holding
company. As a result of this transaction, the shareholders of the old
operating company become shareholders of the holding company, which
in turn owns 100% of the new operating subsidiary.
Although it is possible to use this transaction to alter the fundamental
rights of the shareholders of the old operating company, often there are
no such changes, and the sole purpose of the transaction is to interpose a
holding company between the owners and the operating company. Even
in these situations, however, the Commission consistently has taken the
position that the transaction involves a significant change in the organi-
zational structure and thus involves a sale of a security to the old share-
holders of the operating company.78 The Commission takes this position
whether the transaction is structured as a forward triangular merger,"9 a
reverse triangular merger, 0 a merger into a subsidiary8' or a transfer of
substantially all the assets of a corporation.82 Similarly, the presence or
absence of any debt assumption has been irrelevant to the Commission's
view that the transaction involves a sale.8 3
banks are able to facilitate their expansion into non-banking areas by operating as bank
holding companies.
78. See, eg., Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available June 25,
1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); F. Jos. Lamb Co., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Dec. 24, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct fie); cf Hospital Corp. of Am.,
SEC No-Action Letter (available March 19, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file)
(Commission allowed some structural changes, although fundamentally the corporation
was already in a holding company configuration before as well as after the changes).
79. See Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available June 25, 1982)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file). In a foward triangular merger, the acquired com-
pany is merged into a subsidiary of the acquiring company, and the shareholders of the
acquired company exchange their acquired company stock typically for cash or securities
of the acquiring company.
80. See The Limited Stores, SEC No-Action Letter (available May 12, 1982) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file). In a reverse triangular merger, a subsidiary of the acquiring
company is merged into the acquired company, and the shareholders of the acquired
company exchange their acquired company stock typically for cash or securities of the
acquiring company.
81. See Producers Chem. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 6, 1975)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
82. In the no-action letter of Bob Evans Farms, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (avail-
able Dec. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file), the company, following a merger
to reincorporate in a new state, proposed to transfer substantially all of the company's
assets to a wholly-owned subsidiary. This transaction essentially put the company in a
holding company configuration, although the change was effected by a transfer of assets
rather than the more typical merger. The Commission refused to allow this without
registration. Id.
83. Holding company transactions are often used in acquisition situations, with the
acquisition being financed, at least in part, by loans made to the holding company by a
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Although less common, the Commission also has faced the question of
whether the change from a holding company to a single company config-
uration is a sale for Rule 145 purposes. While one fairly recent no-action
letter may cloud this area a bit,84 the staff has, as one might expect, gen-
erally concluded that such a change involves a sale of securities to those
shareholders who exchange shares of the holding company for shares of
the operating company.85
The Commission's position that a change to or from a holding com-
pany configuration necessarily involves a sale of a security is unsound.
The transaction should be considered a sale only if the structural change
materially affects shareholders' rights, since otherwise the voting share-
holders are making no material investment judgment and thus do not
need the protection of the securities laws.
If, therefore, an issuer uses a merger transaction to interpose a holding
company between the operating company and its shareholders, exchang-
ing share for share with no change in shareholders' rights, management,
capitalization or assets, then voting on that exchange involves the share-
holders in no material investment decision and thus the transaction
should not be deemed a sale. On the other hand, if the transaction, in
addition to changing the issuer into a holding company configuration,
changes shareholders' voting or dividend rights or adds sigificant new
assets to the corporation, then the transaction should be considered a
sale, since shareholders, when voting on such a transaction, need disclo-
sure. The point is, however, that the change in structure, as an isolated
factor, generally is too immaterial to justify characterization of the trans-
action as a sale.
The small amount of case law in the area is consistent with the Au-
thor's analysis. In In re Penn Central Securities Litigation,86 Penn Cen-
third party lender, resulting in increased debt for the corporation. The Commission,
however, has found a sale even without the assumption of acquisition debt by the holding
company. See e.g., Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available June
25, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); The Limited Stores, SEC No-Action Let-
ter (available May 12, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); F. Jos. Lamb Co., SEC
No-Action Letter (available Dec. 24, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file). In
Founders Bank & Trust Co., SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 16, 1981) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file), the staff concluded that a sale was involved in a triangular
merger where the holding company assumed the acquisition debt.
84. In Clevepak Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 15, 1985) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file), the staff assumed a no-action position with regard to a
merger of a parent into an operating subsidiary. In its correspondence with the SEC,
Clevepak focused on the fact that the parent had previously guaranteed the debt of the
subsidiary. The merger, therefore, did not expose the shareholders to new risks. See id.
(Inquiry-I).
85. See, e.g., BTK Indus., SEC No-Action Letter (available March 24, 1983) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file); Reinsurance Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available
Sept. 13, 1974) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct fie); First Nat'l Corp. (First Nat'l Life
Ins. Co.), SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 22, 1974) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
NoAct fie).
86. 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974).
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tral effected a reverse triangular merger, interposing a holding company
between shareholders and the operating company. The purpose of the
transaction apparently was to facilitate the diversification of Penn Cen-
tral into non-railroad business.87 When shareholders brought suit under
Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act,88 alleging misstatements and nondisclosures
in connection with the transaction, the lower and appellate courts both
agreed that there was no sale of a security and thus no Rule 1Ob-5
claim.89 Both courts seemed to base their decisions on the immateriality
of the changes involved. Structural changes alone, therefore, were insuf-
ficient to create a sale.
7. Spin-Offs
A spin-off involves the separation of a part of a corporation's assets
into a new entity, the shares of which then are distributed pro rata to
existing shareholders. An example of this is seen in the W.R. Grace &
Co. no-action letter,9" where Diamond, a company with both coal and
non-coal assets, chose to separate its non-coal assets into a wholly owned
subsidiary of Diamond and then to distribute the shares of the subsidiary
pro rata to the Diamond shareholders. The transaction was subject to
approval by the Diamond shareholders, who paid no consideration for
the distributed stock.91
In the W.R. Grace no-action letter92 and elsewhere,93 the Commission
concluded that a spin-off of the type described in the preceding para-
graph involves a sale of the distributed securities to the shareholders who
vote on and receive the new securities. This is consistent with and appar-
ently based upon the Commission's general position that structural
changes in a corporation involve material changes in the rights of the
shareholders and thus merit the protection of the 1933 Act.94
The Commission has made some practical concessions regarding spin-
offs and now requires no registration of a spin-off if (1) the spin-off is
accompanied by a proxy statement meeting the requirements of the
proxy rules under the 1934 Act and (2) the company whose shares are
distributed is or becomes registered under the 1934 Act.95
87. See id. at 1337.
88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
89. See 494 F.2d at 538-39; 347 F. Supp. at 1337-39.




93. See, e.g., Mustang Fuel Corp. and Mustang Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Aug. 25, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
94. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Hazelton Laboratories Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 13,
1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Tele-Communications, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter (available Jan. 21, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Tucson Elec. Power
Co., SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 30, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file); Enstar Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 17, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
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On a theoretical level, this concession by the Commission makes no
sense, since the distribution of a proxy statement, and a company's status
under the 1934 Act are completely unrelated to the definition of a sale.
On a practical level, however, the accommodation is more defensible. If
the distributing company is a reporting company under the 1934 Act and
solicits proxies or delivers an information statement to the shareholders
prior to their vote, there is, arguably, no need to add the 1933 Act disclo-
sure requirements to that regulatory scheme. The proxy statement pro-
vides the appropriate vehicle for disclosure. 96
More generally, however, the Commission's basic position that a spin-
off involves the sale of a security is defensible. Although superficially a
spin-off may appear to involve a mere reshuffling of the pieces of paper
representing the ownership of the whole entity, such a transaction can
involve material changes for shareholders. For example, it is likely that
the segment that is spun off will have, either immediately or in the future,
management different from the remaining corporation. The newly in-
dependent segment also will be cut off from the financial resources of the
rest of the corporation. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, there
may be differences in value between the sum of the independent parts and
the whole-whether rational or not, the market might place a higher or
lower value on the fragmented entity.97
A different result is required, however, when a board approves a spin-
off without a shareholder vote. While one might concede that a sale oc-
curs when shareholders vote to authorize a spin-off, it is impossible, in
this Author's view, to find a sale without a vote of shareholders. If the
board of directors authorizes the spin-off without any shareholder ap-
proval, the shareholders are not involved in any material investment de-
cision. As a result, shareholders do not need the protection of the
disclosure provisions of the 1933 Act, and it is inappropriate to conclude
brary, NoAct file); Trans World Corp.: Trans World Airlines, SEC No-Action Letter
(available Dec. 9, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct fie). The Commission, however,
reached a contrary decision in an earlier no-action response. See Jenoa, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter (available Nov. 3, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
96. In instances where the Commission's criteria are met and, as a result, no registra-
tion of a spin-off is required, the Commission also has taken the position that the securi-
ties in the hands of the shareholders are not restricted and thus are freely tradable. See,
e.g., Hazelton Laboratories Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 13, 1985)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Tele-Communications, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Jan. 21, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Tucson Elec. Power Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 30, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file);
Enstar Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 17, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
NoAct fie); Trans World Corp.: Trans World Airlines, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Dec. 9, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
97. An example of this phenomenon surfaced in the recent battle for control of Rev-
lon. In that case, Revlon's investment bankers estimated that, given sufficient time, they
could sell the divisions of Revlon for approximately $60 to $70 per share, but if forced to
sell Revlon as a whole, the price would be "in the 'mid 50' dollar range." Revlon v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 177 (Del. 1986).
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that the transaction involves a sale of securities to the nonvoting
shareholders.
There are, however, cases" and no-action letters99 that are inconsis-
tent with the foregoing assertion. Generally, the cases involve a common
scheme in which a publicly held parent corporation (parent) forms a sub-
sidiary company (subsidiary), which acquires the assets of a privately
held third company (third) in exchange for stock in the subsidiary."°
The parent, which continues to retain shares in the subsidiary after the
acquisition, spins off its shares of the subsidiary pro rata to its (parent's)
public shareholders. The spin-off is authorized by the board of directors
of the parent without any shareholder vote. The result of the transaction
is that the subsidiary, whose assets usually consist only of the assets ac-
quired from third, is now publicly held, but no 1933 Act registration
statement was ever filed by the subsidiary.
The courts have held that such spin-offs involved the sale of the dis-
tributed securities to the shareholders of the parent who received the
stock of the subsidiary, even though shareholders did not vote on the
transaction. 01 After struggling, the courts concluded that the transac-
tions involved a "disposition of a security ... for value"' 2 and thus a
"sale" within the section 2(3) definition. One court found the value nec-
essary to support a sale "in the form of a contribution of substantially
new assets to [the] ... subsidiary and the creation of a public market in
the shares with its resulting benefits to the defendants, including
insiders."' 3
It appears that the Commission also is prepared to find a sale of securi-
ties in a spin-off that involves no shareholder vote. In the Chester County
Security Fund, Inc. no-action letter,"o for example, the parent acquired,
perhaps from an affiliated company, the subsidiary at least two years
98. See infra note 100.
99. See, e.g., Chester County Sec. Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 15,
1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (Commission analysis indicating that a sale
would occur, without shareholder vote on spin-off); Coaches of Am., Inc., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (available July 29, 1974) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (Commission
indicating that 1933 Act registration was necessary for a spin-off to be effected by the
board of directors without shareholder approval).
100. See SEC v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 937 (1974); SEC v. Harwyn Indus., 326 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
101. See Datronics, 490 F.2d at 254-55; Harwyn Indus., 326 F. Supp. at 954.
102. See Datronics, 490 F.2d at 253-54 (quoting the definition of sale in § 2(3) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982)); Harwyn Indus., 326 F. Supp. at 953-54 (same).
103. Harwyn Indus., 326 F. Supp. at 954. Theoretically, these courts, in looking for
"value" to support the finding of a sale, are concentrating on the wrong party. The focus
should be on whether the putative purchaser (the shareholder) surrenders value, not on
whether the parent is benefitted by the transaction in some fashion. The purpose of the
1933 Act is to require disclosure when investors part with value in exchange for
securities.




prior to the spin-off. Apparently, the spin-off was proposed solely to ex-
tricate the parent from a line of business that it no longer desired to
pursue. No shareholder vote was required for the spin-off. Nonetheless,
the Commission seemed to conclude that a sale was involved.10 5
These opinions indicate that the Commission and the courts become
concerned when a privately held company, third, is converted into a pub-
licly held company without registration under the 1933 Act.1°6 Never-
theless, the cases are clearly wrong. Since the shareholders of the parent
are involved in no material investment decision, disclosure to such share-
holders is unnecessary, and therefore it is inappropriate to define the
transaction as a sale under the 1933 Act. Instead, the problem, to the
extent that there is one, is properly addressed under the provisions of the
1934 Act. Specifically, if after the spin-off is completed the subsidiary
has five hundred shareholders and $5 million or more in assets, it will be
subject to the reporting requirements and the proxy rules of the 1934
Act.10 7 This is the vehicle through which Congress and the Commission
decided to ensure disclosure by publicly held companies, and it makes no
sense to force such transactions, at the cost of substantial theoretical
damage, into a 1933 Act transaction.
8. Transfer of Assets Without Subsequent Liquidation
A curious problem concerning Rule 145(a)(3) 108 arises when share-
holders of the acquired company vote on whether the company should
transfer its assets in exchange for stock in the acquiring company. Such
a transaction involves a sale of securities to the shareholders of the ac-
quired company only if the acquiring company's securities, which are
exchanged directly with the acquired company, are distributed through a
subsequent liquidation to the voting shareholders of the acquired com-
pany.XO9 Thus, if the acquiring company's securities are retained by the
acquired company, the transaction does not involve an offer or a sale of
securities to the shareholders of the acquired company.
One must not, however, conclude that such a transaction involves no
sale of securities. There is a sale, but the sale is, as a conceptual matter,
105. See id. Registration was not required, however, because the shareholders of the
parent, who were to receive the shares of the spun-off subsidiary, received information
equivalent to that required by Regulation 14C of the 1934 Act, see id. (citing Regulation
14C, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-1 to .14c-101 (1987)), and the spun-off company was to be
registered under the 1934 Act prior to the distribution of the spun-off shares. See id.
106. One court refused to find a sale in a conventional spin-off involving a "closely-
held family corporation" which produced no "public market as found in the Datronics
line of cases." Rathborne v. Rathborne, 508 F. Supp. 515, 518 (E.D. La. 1980), aff'd,
683 F.2d 914 (1982).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1982). By rule, the Commission raised the asset limit
to $5 million. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-l (1987).
108. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(3) (1987). For the text of Rule 145(a)(3), see supra
note 1.




made to the acquired company, which purchases the securities in ex-
change for its assets. Rule 145(a)(3) provides that in the absence of a
distribution, no sale is made to the shareholders of the acquired
company.
The practical implication of this provision is significant to the acquir-
ing company. Because the acquiring company is selling its securities
only to one investor, the acquired company, it may be relieved of the
burden of registration, since such a transaction likely would qualify for
the exemption from registration provided by section 4(2)110 or Regula-
tion D.' 1 Those exemptions may not be available if, instead, one were
required to count each shareholder of the acquired company as an offeree
or purchaser of the acquiring company's securities." 12
As a policy matter, however, it is difficult to understand the basis for
the Commission's position on this matter. If shareholders of the ac-
quired company vote to authorize the sale of the company's assets in
exchange for the stock of the acquiring company, they are making an
investment judgment. It seems unimportant whether the acquiring com-
pany shares are liquidated to the shareholders of the acquired company
or are held by the agents of such shareholders at the acquired company
level. In either event, if shareholders of the acquired company vote on
the exchange, they are the decisionmakers with regard to the purchase of
the stock of the acquiring company and fundamentally are making simi-
lar decisions. 1 3 Disparate treatment, therefore, is inappropriate.
9. Sales to Nonvoting Shareholders
Rule 145 transactions often affect investors who have no voting rights
with regard to the particular transactions involved. For example, corpo-
rate statutes typically do not authorize creditors (such as deben-
tureholders) to vote on a merger.1'4 Similarly, minority shareholders of
the acquired company normally do not vote in a short-form merger. 1 5
Questions have arisen whether sales are involved when these nonvoting
investors exchange their securities in the context of Rule 145
transactions." 6
110. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
111. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 to .506 (1987).
112. Under Rule 506(b)(2) of Regulation D, the maximum number of unaccredited
purchasers is 35. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2) (1987).
113. It is true, of course, that the shareholders of the selling company may also be
entitled to disclosure pursuant to the proxy rules of the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3
(1987), if they vote on the transaction. If, however, the selling corporation is not regis-
tered under the 1934 Act, the shareholders of the selling company may be entitled to no
disclosure when they vote.
114. See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 11.03 (1987).
115. See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 11.04 (1987). In a short-
form merger, a subsidiary may be merged into a parent with only the approval of the
parent's board of directors, provided the parent owns a substantial majority of the subsid-
iary's voting stock.
116. See infra notes 119-20.
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The language of the Rule itself is helpful here, since it states that a sale
occurs "so far as the security holders of a corporation . .. are con-
cerned""' 7 when the reclassification, merger, consolidation or sale of as-
sets "is submitted for the vote or consent of such security holders."
The negative implication of this language is that nonvoting security hold-
ers are not involved in a sale.
The Hy-Gain Electronics Corporation no-action letter 1 9 is consistent
with this interpretation. In that situation, Hy-Gain Electronics Corpora-
tion intended to acquire DARCO, Inc. in a merger, and in the context of
the transaction Hy-Gain would assume the obligations of DARCO's con-
vertible debentures. Under the terms of the indenture relating to
DARCO's convertible debentures, a merger of DARCO did not require
approval of the debentureholder, but the acquiring company was obli-
gated to assume all of DARCO's obligations under the indenture, includ-
ing the conversion feature. The staff concluded that it was not necessary
to register the new Hy-Gain debentures.
A similar response was obtained from the Commission in the Natomas
Co. no-action letter.'20 There, Natomas proposed to effect a reverse tri-
angular merger 121 for the purposes of putting itself into a holding com-
pany configuration. 22 In the transaction, the shareholders of Natomas
would exchange their shares for stock in the holding company. Under
the applicable state laws, however, the Natomas shareholders had no vot-
ing rights or appraisal rights in the transaction. Although the Commis-
sion issued its letter "without necessarily agreeing with [the] analysis that
there is no . . . 'sale' within the meaning of ... the 1933 Act,"' 2 the
Commission permitted the transaction to proceed without registration. ,24
The Commission has, however, taken a different position on short-
form mergers. In its 1974 release,'25 the Commission concluded that a
short-form merger in which minority shareholders received stock in the
parent would constitute a sale, even though the minority shareholders
had no vote in the transaction. The Commission offered no analysis to
support its conclusion. 12
6
117. 17 C.F.R. 230.145(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 26, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file).
120. SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 21, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file).
121. See supra note 80.
122. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying textual discussion of a holding company
configuration.
123. Natomas Co., SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 21, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, NoAct file).
124. See id.
125. Division of Corporation Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related Mat-
ters, Securities Act Release No. 5463, Part V, Illustration C, Question C-I, 1 Fed. Sec. L




Fundamentally, the Commission's responses in this area are sound,
although somewhat unexplained. The Commission's unarticulated
premise appears to be that a sale occurs if a security holder exercises
control over whether he acquires a new investment. This is why a sale is
involved when a shareholder votes on a proposed merger from which he
is to receive stock.' 27 Similarly, although perhaps less obvious, a sale
occurs when a nonvoting shareholder with appraisal rights is confronted
with a merger in which he will receive stock in the acquiring corporation.
For example, when a nonvoting shareholder of a company acquired in a
short-form merger decides whether to accept the stock in the acquiring
corporation or to exercise his appraisal rights, a sale occurs. The trans-
action involves the type of investment decision by the nonvoting share-
holder that in the Commission's view justifies the imposition of
disclosure requirements.
Extending this line of logic, one should conclude that no sale would
occur with respect to a shareholder in a cash-out merger, 2 ' even if that
shareholder is voting and has appraisal rights, since that shareholder is
not making an investment decision concerning the purchase of a security.
His only choice is to accept the proffered cash or pursue his appraisal
rights.
Finally, the Commission is correct in its view that no sale is involved
when one without either voting rights or appraisal rights exchanges se-
curities in a stock-for-stock merger.'29 While such person obviously re-
ceives a new security in the transaction, he has no choice but to accept
the proffered security. He is not involved in any material investment
decision, and in such an instance disclosure is meaningless.
C. Sales Outside Rule 145
Most sales of securities, of course, fall outside Rule 145 and therefore
are not subject to the special provisions and definitions of the Rule.
Some of these transactions, however, may involve amalgamations or re-
capitalizations and thus look very much like a Rule 145 transaction. An
example of this would be a B-type' 30 reorganization in which sharehold-
ers of the acquired company are individually, and not in the context of a
statutory merger, offered stock of the acquiring company in exchange for
their acquired company stock.' 3 ' Another example, which was discussed
127. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
128. In a cash-out merger, shareholders of the acquired company receive cash, as op-
posed to stock in the acquiring company.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 118-24.
130. "B-type reorganization" refers to a tax exempt reorganization under
§ 368(a)(l)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1982). A discus-
sion of the tax consequences of B-type reorganizations is beyond the scope of this Article.
For an explanation see 2 B. Bittker, M. Emory & W. Streng, Federal Income Taxation of
Corporations and Shareholders, Forms 1 14.13, at 14-228 to -230 (rev. ed. 1982).
131. It is clear that these exchanges are not within Rule 145. See Division of Corpora-
tion Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related Matters, Securities Act Release
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earlier,'3 2 is a sale of assets by the acquired company in exchange for the
stock of the acquiring company, unaccompanied by a subsequent distri-
bution of the acquiring company stock to the shareholders of the ac-
quired company. 133
Although it is clear that such transactions technically are not within
Rule 145'11 and thus are not subject to its special provisions, the Com-
mission has nonetheless indicated a willingness to use Rule 145 for a
certain amount of guidance regarding such transactions. For example,
the Commission has indicated a willingness to allow the use of Form S-
14135 (and, one must assume, its successor, Form S-4 36) in certain such
non-Rule 145 transactions.1 37 It appears that the rationale for this ad-
ministrative determination is based on the suitability of the Form as a
disclosure guide for certain non-Rule 145 transactions, such as B-type
reorganizations or sales of assets without liquidation.
A similar line of logic would indicate that Rule 145(b), which allows
limited announcements of Rule 145 transactions,'38 should be considered
an appropriate guide for announcements of non-Rule 145 amalgamations
and recapitalizations.' 39 Rule 145(b) is designed specifically to provide
reasonable guidelines for announcements of Rule 145 transactions, and it
seems sensible to use it as a guide for announcements of similar non-Rule
145 transactions, which also are material events to the companies and
shareholders involved and thus require disclosure. The Commission,
however, has not expressed its views regarding the availability of Rule
145(b) as a guide for announcements of non-Rule 145 transactions.
No. 5463 Part II, Illustration E, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3058, at 3067-6 (Feb. 28,
1974). In St. Lawrence Seaway Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 12, 1973)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file), the Commission found Rule 145 to be unavailable
for a voluntary exchange with the sole shareholder of a corporation.
The language of Rule 145 restricts its applicability to instances where the transaction
"is submitted for the vote or consent of such security holders .... ." 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.145(a) (1987). For the text of Rule 145(a), see supra note 1. This requirement is
not met in a B-type reorganization.
132. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
133. Rule 145(a)(3)(ii) requires some distribution to the shareholders of the corpora-
tion transferring its assets. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(3)(ii) (1987). For the text of Rule
145(a)(3), see supra note 1. Two Commission no-action letters applying these concepts to
exchanges of assets by limited partnerships are Portage County Partners, SEC No-Action
Letter (available Dec. 2, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file), and South Ranch Oil
Income & Trading Co., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 20, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, NoAct file).
134. See supra notes 131 & 133.
135. 17 C.F.R. § 239.23 (1985).
136. Form S-14 was superceded by Form S-4 in 1985. See Securities Act Release No.
33-6578, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,418, at 62,066 (Apr. 23, 1985); see also infra
note 142.
137. See Division of Corporation Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related
Matters, Securities Act Release No. 5463, Part V, Illustration C, Question C-2, I Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3058, at 3067-9 (Feb. 28, 1974).
138. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(b) (1987). For the text of Rule 145(b) see supra note 1.
139. For a discussion of such announcements, see infra notes 172-187 and accompany-
ing text.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Nor has the Commission expressed itself regarding the applicability of
the Rule 145(c) definition of underwriter 4 ' to any of the amalgamations
or recapitalizations that fall outside Rule 145. Here, however, it would
be unwise to expand the applicability of that definition, because, as will
be discussed later, 14 1 that definition is flawed by its breadth, catching
persons who sometimes have little ownership and no managerial respon-
sibilities in the surviving company. To expand the Rule 145(c) definition
outside Rule 145 transactions would, therefore, be entirely unwarranted.
D. Sales Within Rule 145
Although Rule 145 subjects certain transactions to the disclosure re-
quirements of the 1933 Act, these transactions still may qualify for
favorable treatment under other rules or provisions.
1. Registration and Available Exemptions
Normally, if the 1933 Act mandates registration of a Rule 145 transac-
tion, it would be on a Form S-4, a registration statement adopted by the
Commission for amalgamations and single company recapitalizations.14 2
Form S-4 also may be used to satisfy the parties' proxy disclosure re-
quirements under the 1934 Act. 43 Thus, for example, if Alpha acquires
Beta through a merger in exchange for Alpha stock, Alpha's and Beta's
disclosure requirements under the federal proxy rules, assuming the com-
panies report under the 1934 Act, and Alpha's prospectus delivery re-
quirements under the 1933 Act, assuming the offering is to be registered,
are both met by supplying the shareholders of the companies with a joint
proxy statement that contains the information required by Form S-4.
It is also possible for a Rule 145 transaction to qualify for an exemp-
tion from the 1933 Act registration requirements.'" With regard to
transactional exemptions of general applicability, Regulation D, 45 which
provides for exemptions from registration for certain limited offerings,
may be applicable in Rule 145 transactions. Rule 145 transactions also
may be effected pursuant to the other transactional exemptions, includ-
140. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987). For text of Rule 145(c) see supra note 1.
141. See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
142. Form S-4 was adopted by the Commission in 1985. See Business Combination
Transactions-Adoption of Registration Form, Securities Act Release No. 3-6578, 6 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 72,418, at 62,065 (Apr. 23, 1985).
Form S-4 incorporates the fundamental integration philosophy of Forms S-1, S-2 and
S-3 by allowing participants in a Rule 145 transaction to incorporate by reference certain
information about the companies involved in the transaction to the extent that the infor-
mation is otherwise generally available, while requiring complete disclosure about the
particular transaction. Securities Act Release No. 6578, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
72,418, at 62,066 (Apr. 23, 1985), provides an excellent discussion of the new form.
143. Form S-4 provides a basis for using a single document to satisfy both the 1933
Act and 1934 Act requirements. See Form S-4, Gen. Instruction E, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 7162, at 6262.
144. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1987) (Preliminary Note).
145. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .506 (1987).
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ing section 4(2),"' 6 the private placement exemption, section 4(6), '4 the
accredited investors exemption, Regulation A,148 the small-offerings ex-
emption, or the intrastate exemptions under either Rule 147119 or section
3(a)(11).150 In addition, section 3(a)(9), 5' which provides an exemption
for certain single company recapitalizations,' 52 and section 3(a)(10), '
which provides an exemption from registration for exchanges of securi-
ties approved as fair by courts or certain governmental agencies," may
be available for Rule 145 transactions. Finally, no registration of a Rule
146. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). See Baker Industries,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 14, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file).
147. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1982). Section 4(6) was passed
subsequent to the adoption of Rule 145, but it is clear from the language of the Prelimi-
nary Note to Rule 145 that section 4(6) would be available for a Rule 145 transaction.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1987) (Preliminary Note) ("[t]ransactions for which statutory
exemptions under the Act... are otherwise available are not affected by Rule 145").
148. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251 to .264 (1987). See Securities Act Release No. 5463, Part I,
Illustration D, Question D-1, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3058, at 3067-4 (Feb. 28,
1974).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1987), was relied upon in Hungry Tiger, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter (available Aug. 27, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11) (1982). The lack of clarity in this statutory exemption makes
it practically unavailable. See Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities
Act of 1933: Practical Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 Duke L.J. 1139, 1165-
67.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1982).
152. There are a number of no-action letters dealing with the availability of § 3(a)(9) in
Rule 145 transactions. See, e.g., Clevepak Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar.
23, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Vista Mortgage & Realty, SEC No-Action
Letter (available June 18, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); see also, Securities
Act Release No. 5463, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3058, at 3067-4 (Feb. 28, 1974)
(Illustration C).
For an excellent article on § 3(a)(9), see Hicks, Recapitalizations Under Section 3(a)(9)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1057 (1975).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1982).
154. There are numerous no-action letters in which Rule 145 transactions qualified for
an exemption from registration pursuant to § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(l0) (1982). It
was somewhat surprising to find so many types of situations and industries in which the
fairness evaluations necessary for the § 3(a)(10) exemption were available. See, e.g.,
CommerceAmerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 16, 1985) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file) (fairness evaluation by Indiana banking agency for exchange
of bank holding company stock for stock in the acquired company); Arizona Silver Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter (available June 26, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file)
(fairness evaluation by Canadian court for amalgamation in which shareholders of each
company receive shares of the newly formed company in exchange for their shares in the
amalgamated companies); Oracle Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available June 17, 1985)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (fairness evaluation by California Corporations De-
partment for exchange of subsidary's stock with stock of parent); Old Stone Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter (available Dec. 19, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (fairness
evaluation by North Carolina Securities Deputy for acquisition of federal savings bank by
exchanging shares of the holding company with shares of the savings bank); Western
Gulf Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 26, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, NoAct file) (fairness evaluation by Texas Savings and Loan Commissioner for
merger ultimately resulting in a savings and loan holding company configuration); Gulf
United Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 15, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
145 transaction is required if only exempt securities are involved.- 55
The transactional exemptions often require that the offerees and pur-
chasers meet certain qualifications. 15 6 In evaluating these requirements,
the characteristics of the voting shareholders who are to receive stock,
rather than the characteristics of the acquired company that is a party to
the merger, are relevant. 157 Thus, for example, if Alpha proposes to use
Rule 506158 to merge Beta into Alpha in a Rule 145 transaction in which
the Beta shareholders will receive Alpha common stock, the availability
of Rule 506 depends upon establishing that all Beta shareholders meet
the sophistication or accredited investor requirements of Rule
506(b)(2)(ii). 159 Similarly, in calculating the maximum number of pur-
chasers under Rule 505 or Rule 506,16° one must include each Beta
shareholder.
In judging the availability of these exemptions, however, the Commis-
sion does not take into consideration those shareholders relegated to cash
only.16 1 Accordingly, in a merger effected under section 4(2), the private
placement exemption,162 the sophistication requirements apply only to
shareholders who are offered stock in the transaction, and the exemption
is not lost if unsophisticated shareholders are relegated to cash. 163 The
same line of reasoning should lead one calculating the maximum number
of purchasers under Rule 505 or Rule 506 to exclude persons relegated to
cash and should permit the use of Rule 147,'" the intrastate exemption,
in instances in which out-of-state shareholders are offered and receive
only cash under the terms of the merger.
NoAct file) (fairness evaluation by Commissioner of Insurance of Alabama for statutory
plan of exchange of subsidiary's stock for the parent's stock).
155. Subsections 2 through 7 of § 3(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)-(7)
(1982), permit the sale of certain securities without registration under the 1933 Act. Of
those exemptions, § 3(a)(2), which provides an exemption for securities issued by banks,
and § 3(a)(5), which provides for an exemption for securities issued by savings and loan
and certain other financial institutions, are probably the most likely to be available in a
Rule 145 transaction, since other types of exempted securities typically are not involved
in mergers and recapitalizations.
156. For example, qualification for an exemption pursuant to section 4(2) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982), requires that officers and purchasers have access to or be
provided with all material information about the transaction. See infra note 166.
157. Rule 145 itself indicates as much. Section (a) of the Rule refers only to "the
security holders of a corporation," not to the acquired company, in setting forth the rule
on when an offer and sale occur. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (a) (1987); supra note 1 for the
text of Rule 145(a).
158. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1987) (within Regulation D).
159. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1987); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1987) (de-
fining "accredited investor" for Regulation D purposes).
160. Subject to certain significant exceptions, Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii)
(1987), and Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (1987), limit the number of purchasers
to 35.
161. See infra note 163.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
163. See Baker Indus., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 14, 1981) (LEXIS, Fed-
sec library, NoAct file).
164. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1987).
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Issuers, especially small issuers, generally perceive significant advan-
tages in avoiding the expense, inconvenience and delay of registering a
Rule 145 transaction. It is clear to this Author, however, that the advan-
tages of avoiding registration are often overestimated. The principal per-
ceived source of expense and inconvenience in registration is the
disclosure requirements. Qualifying for an exemption from registration,
however, does not always remove the extensive disclosure requirements
of the securities laws. Some of the exemptions, such as the private place-
ment exemptions under Regulation D16 and section 4(2),166 require dis-
closure of the same information that is required in a registration
statement. In other instances where disclosure is not a prerequisite for
the availability of the exemption, such as under Rule 147167 or section
3(a)(9), 168 the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts 169 necessi-
tate the disclosure of all material facts regarding the companies and the
transaction. It is likely, therefore, that counsel will recommend
(soundly, in this Author's opinion) that a disclosure document not unlike
a Form S-4 be provided in connection with the transaction.
170
In light of those disclosure obligations, it may be erroneous to assume
that one saves a significant amount of time by avoiding registration,
although one does, obviously, eliminate the delay caused by the staff's
review of the registration statement. Even that time savings, however,
may be insignificant in many instances, since in recent years the staff has
instituted a no-review policy for many 1933 Act filings. When the Com-
mission chooses not to review a 1933 Act registration statement, the re-
gistration normally becomes effective within a week of filing.
Finally, one must consider the restrictions on resale of unregistered
securities. Although this problem will be discussed in detail in Part 11,171
unregistered securities often are subject to significant resale restric-
tions, 172 while registered securities generally are freely tradable at any
165. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .506 (1987). Offerings pursuant to Rule 505 or Rule 506
require disclosure as a prerequisite to the availability of the exemption unless the sales are
limited to accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (1987).
166. Although some uncertainty still surrounds the exemption provided by § 4(2), 15
U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982), it is now generally recognized that the offerees and purchasers
must be provided with the same kind of information that would otherwise be contained in
a registration statement. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Private Offering Exemption-Recent
Developments, 37 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 17 (1976). But cf Schneider, The Statutory Law of
Private Placements, 14 Rev. Sec. Reg. 869, 877-79 (1981) (arguing that offerees need not
be provided information "as extensive in scope and detail" as the information required in
a Form S-1).
167. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1987) (intrastate exemption).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1982) (exchange by issuer of one security for another with
existing security holders).
169. Section 12(2) under the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982), and Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) are the most formidable of the antifraud provisions.
170. See the discussion in Campbell, An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky
Regulation, 10 J. Corp. L. 553, 561 (1985).
171. See infra notes 226-375 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 292-312, 315-16, 321-27, 328-41, 344-60 and accompanying text.
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time after the initial offering by the issuer.
Accordingly, although there are certainly instances in which it is ad-
vantageous to avoid registration, this Author cautions against an auto-
matic aversion to registration of Rule 145 transactions. Instead, one
must evaluate each situation closely, understanding that in some in-
stances the difference in the amount of disclosure, delay and cost may be
insignificant, and that any slight advantage gained may be outweighed by
countervailing factors.
2. Announcements and Statements During A Rule 145 Transaction
It is often appropriate or even necessary for firms involved in mergers
and other Rule 145 transactions to announce the transaction, refer in a
statement to the transaction or engage in conduct that has a positive im-
pact on the ability to complete the transaction.7 3 If the announcement
or conduct is considered an "offer" of the Rule 145 stock, 174 the registra-
tion provisions of the 1933 Act are applicable. This creates problems for
the parties involved in the Rule 145 transaction, since it may be impossi-
ble to structure the offer (that is, the announcement) in a way that meets
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.17 5
Rule 145(b) contains a safe harbor provision for the announcement of
a Rule 145 transaction. 176 Under its terms, no offer is involved if the
announcement does no more than identify the parties to the Rule 145
transaction, briefly describe their business and the transaction, and give
basic information about the shareholders' meetings to be held.
It is clear that Rule 145(b) is not the exclusive source of criteria for
permissible announcements of a Rule 145 transaction. 177 Rule 134178
173. For examples of such situations, see infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
174. "Rule 145 stock" refers to securities received in a Rule 145 transaction.
175. Unless an exemption from registration is applicable, § 5(c) of the 1933 Act makes
it illegal to offer securities prior to the filing of a registration statement with the Commis-
sion. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1982). Under § 5(b) of the 1933 Act, any written offer of a
security is illegal after a registration statement has been filed unless the offer is accompa-
nied by a prospectus. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1982). Of course, a mere announcement
could never contain all the information that is required in a prospectus.
176. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(b) (1987). For the text of Rule 145(b), see supra note 1.
177. See Division of Corporation Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related
Matters, Securities Act Release No. 5463, Part II, Illustration F, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) t 3058, at 3067-6 to -7 (Feb. 28, 1974). To qualify for the safe harbor of Rule
145(b), however, the announcement must meet all the requirements of the Rule and must
not include information outside the expressly authorized categories. Thus in Chris-Craft
Indus. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970), the court held Rule 135, 17
C.F.R. § 230.135 (1987), which describes communications not deemed an offer, unavaila-
ble for an announcement containing unauthorized information. See Chris-Craft, 426
F.2d at 574. The legitimacy of such announcements would depend, therefore, upon
whether an offer was involved under case law interpretations. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 183-87.




and Rule 135179 are the most obvious alternatives for such announce-
ments, although it may be difficult to construct a useful announcement
within the limits of Rule 134,"80 and the provisions of Rule 135 are prob-
ably no more liberal than those of Rule 145(b).' In addition to these
three Rules, the Commission, through its releases and no-action letters,
has provided substantial guidance concerning conduct or announcements
that constitute offers.18 2 One must, therefore, ensure that any announce-
ment exceeding the limits of Rule 145(b), Rule 134 or Rule 135 is not an
offer within these Commission pronouncements.
As a general matter, it appears that the Commission uses an intent or
purpose test to determine the existence of an offer.183 Thus, if an an-
nouncement is intended to facilitate the issuance of stock in the Rule 145
transaction, the Commission would conclude that the announcement is
an offer. On the other hand, if the announcement serves a purpose in-
dependent of the Rule 145 transaction, it will not be considered an
offer. 184
This analysis is the basis for the Commission's conclusion that an is-
suer in registration may continue to advertise its products, send periodic
reports and proxy information to shareholders, issue press releases re-
garding factual business and financial developments and respond to unso-
licited inquiries for information. 8 5 Although in each of these instances
179. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1987) (rule describing statements that may be made by an
issuer before registration and that are not deemed to be offers).
180. The permitted categories of information under Rule 134 are unresponsive to the
needs of companies involved in Rule 145 transactions because Rule 134 does not allow
disclosure of any information regarding the companies as merged. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.134(a) (1987).
181. Unlike Rule 134, Rule 135 specifically provides for announcements regarding the
"exchange for other securities of the issuer or of another issuer." 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.135(a)(4) (1987).
182. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
183. See generally Interpretive Releases, Publication of Information Prior to or After
Effective Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33-3844, 1 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCII) 51 3250-3256, at 3147-52 (Oct. 8, 1957). The factual examples in particu-
lar suggest that the Commission tries to determine the true intent of the party making the
announcement. See id. % 3256, at 3150-51.
184. Alma Sec. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 2, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, NoAct file), provides a good example. Alma Securities inquired whether publica-
tion of a tombstone ad announcing the completion of a Regulation D offering would
constitute an offer. Although the Commission refused to opine on the request, it indi-
cated that such an ad would be permissible "following the completion of an isolated
Regulation D offering where the advertisement would have no immediate or direct bear-
ing on contemporaneous or subsequent offers or sales of securities." Id. On the other
hand, the Commission indicated that an offer would be involved if the issuer were in-
volved in multiple programs and announced the completion of each deal. Id. The im-
plicit reasoning appears to be that the purpose for such announcements would be to
advertise future programs and thus offer the securities involved in those future programs.
185. See Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities are in
Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3056, at
3064 (Aug. 16, 1971); Publication of Information Prior to or After the Filing and Effec-
tive Date [sic] of a Registration Statement Under the Securities Act, Securities Act Re-
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the statements or responses of the company may have a favorable impact
on the company's ability to sell its stock or complete the Rule 145 trans-
action, the statements have an independent and legitimate purpose.
For similar reasons, the Commission indicated that, in the context of a
merger transaction under Rule 145, no offer was involved in an an-
nouncement that contained, in addition to the items enumerated in Rule
145(b), a statement of an intent to liquidate a subsidiary and other assets
after the completion of the merger. 18 6 The legitimate purpose for such a
statement, according to the Commission, was the satisfaction of the com-
pany's obligation to disclose material information. 7
In light of this, one involved in a Rule 145 transaction should be able
to make a complete announcement of all material facts surrounding the
transaction, including, in addition to plans to liquidate assets as de-
scribed above, any plans regarding changes in senior management or the
board of directors of the surviving company, changes in corporate struc-
ture, financing of the acquisition and any anticipated consolidation or
elimination of operations. So long as an announcement is limited to the
disclosure of material facts, the courts and the Commission should not
consider the announcement to be an offer, even if such announcement
exceeds Rule 145(b), since the purpose of the announcement is to fulfill
the parties' disclosure obligations.
3. Tender Offer to Facilitate a Merger
In a friendly acquisition that is to be structured as a stock-for-stock
merger, the acquiring company may, after the merger has been approved
by the acquired company's directors but before the final shareholder
vote, make a cash tender for part or all of the acquired company's voting
stock. This technique may be attractive to the acquiring company, since
it allows part of the acquisition to be made for cash and helps ensure
shareholder approval. 88 The tender also benefits shareholders of the ac-
quired company by allowing them a cash-out option.
In such instances, the concern arises that the announcement of the
cash tender might be considered an offer of the stock to be issued to the
lease No. 33-5009, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 1465, at 2134 (Oct. 6, 1969); Publication
of Information Prior to or After Effective Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act
Release No. 33-3844, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3250, at 3147 (Oct. 8, 1957).
186. See Division of Corporation Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related
Matters, Securities Act Release No. 5463, Part 3, Illustration, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
3058, at 3067-7 (Feb. 28, 1974).
187. See id.
188. The ability to bring some stability or certainty to these situations may become
even more imperative after a case like ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 222 Neb. 136, 382
N.W.2d 576 (1986), which makes the impact of definitive merger agreements more uncer-
tain. In ConAgra, the board of directors signed a definitive merger agreement but subse-
quently repudiated it when they received a higher bid. See id. at 138, 382 N.W.2d at 577.
The court found no liability for the repudiation of the terms of the merger agreement,
concluding, apparently, that the board's fiduciary duty overrode the contract. See id. at
156, 382 N.W.2d at 587-88.
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acquired company's shareholders in the merger. The Commission unfor-
tunately has given inconsistent responses to this problem.
In the Bendix Corp. no-action letter,"8 9 Bendix, which had agreed to
acquire Ex-Cell-O in a merger in exchange for Bendix stock, proposed to
make a cash tender for the Ex-Cell-O stock prior to the completion of the
merger. The staff was "unable to concur in [Bendix's] opinion that the
Tender Offer [did] not constitute an 'offer to sell' " the Bendix stock that
was to be issued in the merger, because the shareholders were "being
asked to make an investment decision" whether to take "the cash now or
the stock later."' 90 One year later, however, the Commission reached
what appears to be the opposite result in the United Technologies Corp.
no-action letter,' 9' concluding that such a cash tender, preceding the
completion of a merger involving a stock exchange, did not constitute an
offer of the stock to be issued in the merger.
The Commission's response in the United Technologies Corp. no-action
letter is correct. As described in the immediately preceding section, the
Commission over the years has applied a purpose or intent test to deter-
mine whether an announcement or action constitutes an offer.' 9 2 An an-
nouncement of a cash tender offer has a legitimate and independent
purpose other than to condition the market for the stock offering that
will occur in the merger. Although the announcement of the cash tender
may in fact have a beneficial impact on the ability to complete the merger
and to issue the acquiring company's stock, the independent purpose of
the tender is to facilitate the completion of the acquisition by allowing
the acquiring company to stabilize the situation. This independent pur-
pose should be sufficient to avoid inclusion of the cash tender in the defi-
nition of offer.' 93
4. Regulatory Concessions, Including Waiver
of Financial Statements Requirements
Certain Rule 145 transactions may result in a new issuer without any
significant changes in the corporation or the rights of shareholders. An
example of this is a triangular merger effected solely for the purpose of
interposing a holding company between the shareholders and the operat-
189. SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 30, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file).
190. Id.
191. SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 24, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file). In United Technologies, it was clear that the tender was subject to the disclosure
requirements of the tender offer rules of the 1934 Act. See id. In the Bendix situation, on
the other hand, there is no indication in the correspondence that the proposed tender was
subject to the tender offer rules of the 1934 Act. See The Bendix Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, (available Mar. 30, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file). The significance, if
any, of this difference is not clear from the letters.
192. See supra notes 183-84.
193. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
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ing company, with no other changes in shareholders' rights.'94 Addi-
tionally, no-sale transactions often result in a new issuer without any
significant substantive change to shareholders. An example of this is a
merger effectuated under the change-in-domicile exemption of Rule
145(a)(2).195
In these situations, the Commission has allowed certain regulatory
concessions, recognizing that the insignificance of the transactions justi-
fies such treatment. Specifically, the Commission has (a) allowed the
successor company, pursuant to Rule 414,196 to adopt the 1933 Act regis-
tration statement of its predecessor,' 97 (b) allowed a successor company
that could not qualify for Rule 414 treatment to register the successor
company's continuing stock option plan by amending the Form S-4 used
to effect the merger, 98 (c) allowed the continued availability of the Rule
16b-3 exemption 199 from the 1934 Act's section 16(b) 2°° liability of direc-
tors, officers and principal stockholders, without a new approval by the
shareholders of the successor corporation,20' (d) affirmed the availability
of the Rule 16b-7 20 2 exemption of the 1934 Act for certain acquisitions
and dispositions of securities pursuant to a merger or consolidation,2"3
(e) affirmed that Rule 12g-32 1 of the 1934 Act may relieve the successor
from filing a new 1934 Act registration statement, although a filing of a
Form 8-K20 5 or Form 6-K was required to reflect the succession,20 6
(f) affirmed that the actions and characteristics of a predecessor com-
pany were considered in determining the availability to a successor com-
194. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
196. 17 C.F.R. § 230.414 (1987).
197. See, e.g., Sunsav, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 28, 1986) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file); Ivy Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 5, 1984)
(LEXIS, Fedsee library, NoAct file); The Limited Stores, SEC No-Action Letter (avail-
able May 12, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Good and Bad Times Fund,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 1, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
198. See, e.g., DPL Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available May 16, 1986) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available
June 25, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
199. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-(3) (1987).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
201. See, e.g., Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available June 25,
1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); The Limited Stores, SEC No-Action Letter
(available May 12, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Household Fin. Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter (available July 2, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
202. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-7 (1987).
203. See, e.g., DPL Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available May 16, 1986) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file); Household Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available July
2, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-3 (1987).
205. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1987). Form 8-K is filed by a 1934 Act reporting com-
pany to disclose extraordinary corporate developments.
206. See, e.g., The Limited Stores, SEC No-Action Letter (available May 12, 1982)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); David Minerals Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (avail-
able Sept. 3, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
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pany of certain registration forms under the 1933 Act,2"7 (g) affirmed
that for the purposes of determining the public availability of information
under Rule 144(c),208 the reporting status of the predecessor was consid-
ered, 2" and (h) conceded that insiders of the predecessor who become
insiders of the successor are not required to file a new Form 3210 pursu-
ant to section 16(a) of the 1934 Act.211
In addition, in certain Rule 145 transactions2"2 the Commission has
waived the requirement for disclosure of financial information that may
otherwise be necessary in registered and exempt offerings.23  Although
the Commission's views continue to be somewhat inscrutable, it seems
that the Commission has limited such waivers to instances in which dis-
closure of financial information is unnecessary for an informed invest-
ment judgment.
In one instance, for example, the Commission permitted the omission
of financial information if the Rule 145 transaction involved "only the
[issuer] and one or more of its totally held subsidiaries ... 214 In no-
action letters, however, the Commission eased the structural limitations
of this provision, and, for example, in the GEO Int'l Corp. no-action let-
207. See e.g., DPL Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available May 16, 1986) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file); Household Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available July
2, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Rochester Telephone Corp., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (available July 14, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
208. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (1987).
209. See, e.g., The Limited Stores, SEC No-Action Letter (available May 12, 1982)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); FirstMark, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available
April 27, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
210. When persons become officers, directors or 10% shareholders of companies regis-
tered under the 1934 Act, they are required to file a Form 3 with the Commission. See
Rule 16a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-I (1987).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982); see DPL, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available May
16, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (available June 25, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
212. See infra text accompanying notes 214-16, 219-25.
213. Under the terms of Regulation D, for example, it is often necessary to supply the
offerees and purchasers with the same type of information that is contained in a registra-
tion statement. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (1987). Most commentators agree that the
Section 4(2) exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982), also requires the disclosure of the
same type of information that would be contained in a registration statement. See, eg.,
T. Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 131 (1985); Schwartz, The Private Offering
Exemption-Recent Developments, 37 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 17 (1976). At least one commenta-
tor, however, takes a somewhat different position on the matter. Schneider, The Statu-
tory Law of Private Placements, 14 Rev. Sec. Reg. 869, 878 (1981) ("issuer need only
provide general categories of registration statement information rather than information
precisely identical to that disclosed through the registration process").
214. Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 14(c)(4) (1987). Form S-14, the
predecessor to Form S-4, incorporated the proxy rules by reference. See Form S-14, 17
C.F.R. § 239.23 (1985). Under the incorporated proxy rules, companies were relieved of
financial disclosure requirements if the Rule 145 transaction involved "only the [issuer]
and one or more of its totally owned subsidiaries." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item
14(c)(4) (1987).
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ter,215 waived the requirements for financial statements in a merger be-
tween an operating company and a new shell company formed and
owned by management of the operating company. Similarly, in the Ray-
bestos-Manhattan, Inc. no-action letter,216 an omission of financial state-
ments was permitted when an operating company was merged into a
subsidiary of a newly formed holding company.
Both of the foregoing no-action requests, however, involved no amal-
gamations of assets between independent companies and involved no ma-
terial changes in the contractual rights of shareholders, although the
transactions were structured as mergers.2 7 Apparently, the Commission
concluded that financial statements were not required for an informed
business judgment and thus waived the requirement, even though the
transactions exceeded the Commission's promulgated position.
Technically, this waiver provision is no longer available for Rule 145
transactions. 2 '8 Nonetheless, as suggested below, the fundamental no-
tion underlying the waiver, that no financial disclosures should be re-
quired where rights of shareholders are not materially changed,
continues to be significant for the availability of waivers for financial
information.
Another basis for waiver of financial information is Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 50 ("SAB 50"),219 which deals with the financial require-
ments applicable to a "phantom bank" transaction. Typically, these
transactions involve triangular mergers in which a holding company and
its wholly-owned subsidiary are formed by the management of the oper-
ating bank, and the operating bank is then merged with the holding com-
215. SEC No-Action Letter (available April 6, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file).
216. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available June 25, 1982)
(LEXIS, Frdsec library, NoAct file).
217. See id.; GEO Int'l, SEC No-Action Letter (available April 6, 1987) (LEXIS, Fed-
see library, NoAct file).
218. When the Commission adopted Form S-4, it chose not to incorporate the proxy
rules into the Form. Thus the basis for the waiver has been eliminated, and the new
financial disclosure rules, which are contained in Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10 to
.802 (1987), and Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to .12-29 (1987), do not provide
similar waiver provisions.
There still are certain merger transactions that can qualify for the waiver provided by
the proxy rules. For example, if a company that is reporting under the 1934 Act effects a
merger solely to change its domicile, the change-in-domicile exception of Rule 145(a)(2)
will except the transactions from the 1933 Act requirements. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.145(a)(2) (1987); see also supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text. The solicita-
tions of proxies, however, will remain subject to the proxy rules of the 1934 Act and will
be permitted to omit financial information if the transaction is structured as a parent/
subsidiary merger. Most change-in-domicile mergers are structured in this manner. See,
e.g., Caterpillar Tractor, Co., No-Action Letter (available Feb. 10, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, NoAct file); American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., No-Action Letter (available
March 11, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Rowe Furniture Corp., No-Action
Letter (available Jan. 22, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
219. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 50, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74050, adding
Section F to Topic I: Financial Statements, 74,101, at 63,554 (Mar. 3, 1983).
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pany subsidiary. Although, as previously stated, the Commission treats
these transactions as sales of the holding company stock to the share-
holders of the operating bank,22 the Commission concluded in SAB 50
that no financial statements are required for the transaction if the share-
holders' relative equity ownership remains unchanged after the transac-
tion, if only nominal debt is incurred in the transaction and if the
shareholders have been furnished or are furnished financial statements
for the latest fiscal year.22
The staff has indicated to this Author that SAB 50, notwithstanding its
language, is not limited to bank holding companies but instead is avail-
able for all transactions that fit within its terms. 22 2 Further, pursuant to
Rule 3-13 of Regulation S-X,223 the Commission is prepared to treat re-
quests for relief from financial disclosure requirements on a case-by-case
basis. 224 Finally, in deciding on such requests, the Commission will rely
heavily on the letter and the spirit of SAB 50. 2 1
All of this seems to indicate a willingness on the part of the Commis-
sion to waive the financial disclosure requirements in Rule 145 transac-
tions that, although considered by the Commission to involve sales of
securities, do not involve material changes in the rights of the sharehold-
ers involved. The absence of any material changes at the corporate level,
such as an amalgamation of assets or the addition of any new, material
debt, and the absence of any change in the contractual rights of share-
holders appear to be prerequisites to such a waiver. SAB 50, the prior
position of the Commission, and the no-action letters described above
should provide useful guides in obtaining such waivers from the
Commission.
II. RESALES OF RULE 145 STOCK
The problems relating to Rule 145 are not limited to determining
whether a transaction by the issuer constitutes a sale. Shareholders wish-
ing to resell their stock acquired in a Rule 145 transaction also face nu-
merous obstacles.
A. Generally
Questions regarding resales of securities by non-issuers generally are
220. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
221. See Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 50, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f 74050, adding
Section F to Topic I: Financial Statements, 74,101, at 63,554 (Mar. 3, 1983). SAB 50
also requires that no new classes of stock be authorized or issued, and that there be no
material changes in the condition of the bank. See id.
222. Telephone interview with SEC staff attorney (Aug. 1, 1986).
223. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-13 (1987). This regulation allows the Commission "upon the
informal written request of the registrant, and where consistent with the protection of
investors" to permit the omission of part or all of the required financial statements.




determined by reference to section 4(1) of the 1933 Act,226 which ex-
empts from registration sales by persons other than issuers, underwriters,
and dealers.227 Most sales by shareholders, therefore, are exempt from
registration, since the typical shareholder is not included in any of those
definitions.
There are, however, instances in which a shareholder falls within the
definition of underwriter 2.. and thus loses the section 4(1) exemption. 29
Typically, the part of the underwriter definition that defines an under-
writer as one "who has purchased from an issuer with a view to...
distribution" 230 is most inclusive and thus most troublesome for share-
holders selling Rule 145 stock.
B. Resales Following a No-Sale Transaction
A shareholder who receives stock in a transaction that does not consti-
tute a sale ("no-sale transaction") should not be considered an under-
writer, even if he resells his stock publicly. While such a selling
shareholder certainly would be involved in a "distribution,"23 he did not
acquire his security in a sale and thus should not be considered as having
purchased a security from the issuer. As a result, the shareholder does
not fit into the underwriter definition, since he is not one "who
purchased" a security, and his section 4(1) exemption is preserved.
The Commission seems to accept this fairly obvious analysis and ac-
cordingly has concluded that securities acquired by shareholders in a
change-in-domicile transaction under Rule 145 become freely transfera-
ble in the hands of the shareholders of the newly incorporated com-
pany.232 A similar result should also be reached in any other no-sale
transaction, such as transactions involving immaterial changes in the
226. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1982).
227. Id.
228. Section 2(11) of the 1933 Act defines "underwriter." See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1)
(1982).
229. A shareholder's right to sell securities also may be limited when he is included in
the definition of "issuer." Typically this occurs when the shareholder controls the issuer
of the securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (1982); see also infra notes 373-76 and ac-
companying text.
230. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l1) (1982). The complete definition of an underwriter in section
2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1982), is more expansive, but the quoted provision is most
relevant to resales by shareholders.
231. "Distribution" is considered to be synonymous with "public offering." See Wheat
Report SEC Disclosure Group, Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure to In-
vestors-A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies Under the '33 and '34 Acts
161-62 (CCH) (1969) (hereinafter "Wheat Report"); 1 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 551;
Orrick, Some Interpretative Problems Respecting the Registration Requirements Under the
Securities Act, 13 Bus. Law. 369, 370 (1958).
232. See, e.g., Applied Materials, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 16, 1987)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); The Times Mirror Co., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Feb. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); URS Corp., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (available Apr. 8, 1976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
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rights of shareholders, 233 stock splits2 34 and certain changes in the is-
suer's form of entity.235
As a corollary, the Commission has concluded that a no-sale transac-
tion cannot cleanse a restriction.23 6 Thus, for example, if a shareholder
exchanges a restricted security for a new security in a no-sale transaction,
the new security carries the same restriction as the old security.
Although the Commission announced this notion with regard to securi-
ties restricted by Regulation D or section 4(2),237 the same rule should
apply to securities subject to the resale limitations of Rule 147. 8 In
either instance, the absence of a sale means that the status of the shares
and the shareholder is unchanged.
C. Resales of Rule 145 Stock Acquired in a Registered
Rule 145 Transaction
Securities purchased by investors in a registered Rule 145 offering
("registered Rule 145 stock") generally are freely transferable pursuant
to the exemption provided by section 4(1),239 since such selling share-
holders usually are considered to be outside the definitions of issuer, un-
derwriter or dealer. This is not, however, always the case, and difficult
questions can arise, especially regarding the selling shareholder's status
as an underwriter.
The definition of an underwriter in section 2(11) of the 1933 Act in-
cludes a person who "purchased from an issuer with a view to... distri-
bution ... .2 One problem with this definition is that an extreme
interpretation could result in underwriter status for persons who resell
registered Rule 145 stock in market transactions.
Assume, for example, that Alpha Company acquires Beta Company in
a registered Rule 145 transaction and pays for the acquisition by issuing
Alpha's common stock to the Beta shareholders. If a Beta shareholder,
who previously owned one hundred shares of Beta stock, receives one
hundred shares of the registered Alpha stock and sells the Alpha stock in
a market transaction shortly after the acquisition, the selling shareholder
might be considered an underwriter for two reasons. First, clearly the
selling shareholder purchased his Alpha stock from the issuer.141 Sec-
233. See supra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
236. See The Times Mirror Co., SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 14, 1986)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); URS Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr.
8, 1.976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
237. See supra note 236.
238. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1987). In The URS Corp. no-action letter, the staff stated
that the "shares transferred to shareholders... will be subject to no greater restrictions
...than were applicable to the shares exchanged therefor." SEC No-Action Letter
(available Apr. 8, 1976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
239. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1982).
240. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982).
241. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (1987). For the text of Rule 145 see supra note 1.
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ond, because the resale through a broker involves an offer to all bidders,
it would appear that the sale would be public and thus would constitute a
distribution of the stock by the selling shareholder.242 The selling share-
holder, therefore, seems to fit the definition of an underwriter, since he
"purchased from an issuer with a view to ... distribution .... "I
Such an extreme interpretation, however, would place unnecessary
burdens on shareholders desiring to sell registered Rule 145 stock. Such
shareholders, for example, would be required to comply with the pro-
spectus delivery requirements 244 each time they executed a market sale of
the registered Rule 145 stock, no matter how few shares are involved.
Clearly the difficulties of such compliance for small shareholders would
outweigh any benefits to purchasers or the public resulting from such
disclosure.
On the other hand, if a shareholder sells one hundred thousand shares
of Alpha stock instead of the one hundred shares previously assumed,
one may be less reluctant to consider the shareholder an underwriter.
The size of that sale makes the case for disclosure more compelling and
the relative cost and difficulty of disclosure less significant. Concep-
tually, however, it is nearly impossible to distinguish the two situations.
Both the large and the small shareholder seem to fit the definition of an
underwriter, since each purchased securities from an issuer and resold
them publicly shortly after the purchase. Both, therefore, appear to have
"purchased" with a view to "distribution. '245
Over the years, the Commission has struggled with this problem
outside the setting of Rule 145 transactions. Essentially, the Commission
has attempted to permit free transferability of registered shares unless the
selling shareholder's purchase from the issuer is sufficiently large to make
it appropriate for the selling shareholder to comply with the prospectus
delivery requirements. 246 One commentator reported that the Commis-
sion at one time "applied a rule of thumb" defining an underwriter to
include only persons who purchased "10 percent of the issue. ' 247
In a registered Rule 145 transaction, however, underwriter status for a
selling shareholder is determined, apparently exclusively, 248 under Rule
242. See L. Loss, supra note 74, at 280.
243. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982).
244. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1982).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982).
246. See L. Loss, supra note 74, at 279-80.
247. Id.
248. The matter of exclusivity is not entirely clear, although the language of a no-
action letter supports an exclusivity interpretation. See Coastal Int'l, SEC No-Action
Letter (available Dec. 24, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (stating that "securi-
ties received in a Rule 145 transaction by persons who are neither affiliates of the ac-
quired company nor of the acquiring company are registered securities without
restriction on resale," which language suggests that affiliate status, a Rule 145 test, is
determinative). The Commission has indicated, however, that other persons involved in
facilitating mergers might be considered underwriters in certain instances. See Division
of Corporation Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related Matters, Securities Act
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145(C). 2 4 9 Pursuant to that provision, "an affiliate [("Rule 145 affiliate")]
of... [a] party" to the Rule 145 transaction is considered an underwriter
if he or she "publicly offers or sells" registered Rule 145 stock.2'
"Affiliate" includes a control person.251 While the definition of control
is both complex and uncertain, it may include anyone who either owns or
controls ten percent of the voting stock of a company, holds a significant
managerial position in the company or has a substantial relationship with
either of the foregoing.2 52 This conclusion is consistent with Commission
no-action letters on the subject.253
The conservative practice, therefore is to consider at least all of the
acquired company's ten-percent shareholders," 4 directors and senior
management and all members of the immediate family of all the forego-
Release No. 5463, Section IV, Illustration B, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3058, at 3067-
68 (Feb. 28, 1974).
In addition, it is not clear whether the Commission would apply its one-percent rule to
resales of registered Rule 145 stock. Under the one-percent rule, the Commission at-
tempts to apply resale restrictions to persons acquiring more than one percent of a com-
pany's outstanding stock in a Rule 145 transaction. Apparently, this is based on the
concept that such persons become underwriters. The Commission applies this one-per-
cent rule for resales of Rule 145 stock acquired in certain exempt Rule 145 transactions.
See infra notes 306-13 and accompanying text.
249. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987) (provision of Rule 145 defining persons deemed to
be underwriters under the Rule). For the text of Rule 145(c) see supra note 1.
250. Id.
251. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1987).
252. See Campbell, Defining Control in Secondary Distributions, 18 B.C. Ind. & Com.
L. Rev. 37, 49 (1976).
253. Although the Commission professes not to give no-action positions on the ques-
tion of control, see South Carolina Nat'l, SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 21, 1975)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (even that letter, however, seemed to give some ad-
vice on the matter), there are no-action letters dealing directly with the question of
whether persons associated with acquired companies constitute "affiliates" under Rule
145(c). See, e.g., Galbo, Vincent A., SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 22, 1977)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (the staff was unable to conclude that one who
owned 3.8% of voting stock and was a director and member of executive committee was
not an affiliate); Norton Simon, Inc., No-Action Letter (available Oct. 8, 1976) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file) (staff was unable to conclude that Sidney Factor and Dorothy
Factor were not affiliates, where he owned 1.2% of the company's stock, served as direc-
tor and previously served as senior vice president and member of executive committee,
and relatives, trusts and a charitable foundation of which such relatives were trustees
owned 20%); Uniservice Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 13, 1976)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (the staff was "of the view that [one] may be deemed
to be an affiliate" where he was a director and owned stock, his law firm was counsel to
company, and he served as secretary to the company); Great N. Nekoosa Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (available May 20, 1976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) ("Mrs. Lake
may be deemed an affiliate," since she owned 10%, and "her husband, children,
grandchildren and a trust created by her collectively owned approximately 30%").
254. Some practitioners also assume that the Commission's one-percent rule may re-
strict resales of securities by persons receiving one-percent of the shares offered in a regis-
tered Rule 145 transaction. For an example see § 7.10 of the Acquisition Agreement
between Bank of Boston Corporation and Colonial Bancorp, Inc., 3 H. Deutch, Proxy
Statements: Strategy and Forms § 12.101, at 12-194 (1985). It is not clear, however, that
the Commission would attempt to apply its one-percent rule to such transactions. See
supra note 248; infra notes 306-13 and accompanying text.
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ing, as control persons. As a result, numerous shareholders of the ac-
quired company, including those receiving relatively small amounts of
registered Rule 145 stock, may be, and typically are, caught in the defini-
tion of control and thus may be subject to underwriter status under Rule
145(c).
Such a result is obviously inappropriate. In the first place, it is unfair
to saddle persons holding small amounts of registered Rule 145 stock
with underwriter status. Second, the definition of underwriter in Rule
145(c) addresses the legitimate concern of the Commission only in an
indirect and haphazard fashion. As stated earlier, the Commission legiti-
mately is concerned with controlling large resales of registered Rule 145
stock.255 In determining whether such resales are of sufficient size to
justify application of some limitation, the Commission should look either
to the absolute dollar amount of the resales or to the amount of resales
relative to the total outstanding shares of the acquiring company. Either
of these approaches would address the problem directly. Whether one
had a control relationship with the acquired company, on the other hand,
seems at best indirectly related to the problem.
Notwithstanding these significant flaws in the Commission's definition
of underwriter in Rule 145(c), a number of alternatives exist for Rule 145
affiliates who wish to resell their securities. One alternative is to register
the securities for resale, and, in that regard, the Commission has pro-
vided two methods to facilitate such registered resales. First, the initial
registration statement may provide for the resales by Rule 145 affili-
ates.25 6 In such instances, the acquiring company's registration state-
ment must include information about any Rule 145 affiliate that proposes
to resell stock,257 and the selling affiliate must comply with the prospec-
tus delivery requirements.258
If, however, the Rule 145 affiliate is uncertain as to whether a resale
will take place, a subsequent determination to resell may be handled by
an amendment to the acquiring company's registration statement.25 9 In
that situation, the Commission requires the amendment to contain infor-
mation about the selling affiliate, "[i]nformation with respect to the con-
summation of the transaction pursuant to which the" Rule 145 affiliate
acquired the Rule 145 stock and any material changes in the acquiring
company's situation.26°
255. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
256. See Form S-4 Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, General
Instructions A.1(4), 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7162, at 6261.
257. See Form S-4 Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, Item 7, 2
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7163, at 6266.
258. Section 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982), would apply to such sales, since
the affiliate would be considered an "issuer" within section 2(11) of the 1933 Act. 15
U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1982).
259. See Form S-4 Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, Item 7, 2
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7163, at 6266.
260. See id. Item 7 requires that the information be furnished "in the prospectus, at
320 [Vol. 56
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Another alternative for a Rule 145 affiliate is to resell privately. 26I The
theory here is that if a Rule 145 affiliate resells privately, he would not be
an underwriter within section 2(11), since his stock was not "purchased
from an issuer with a view to . . . distribution .... 262 Although the
Rule 145 affiliate clearly purchased his securities from the issuer,263 the
absence of a public resale on his part means there is no "distribution ' 2'1
of the securities. As a result, the selling Rule 145 affiliate does not fit the
definition of an underwriter under section 2(11), and the resales are ex-
empt under section 4(1).
This analysis is consistent with Rule 145(c), which defines an under-
writer as a Rule 145 affiliate "who publicly offers or sells securities of the
issuer .... "265 If the resale by the Rule 145 affiliate is not "public," he
falls outside the definition of underwriter in Rule 145(c) and thus retains
a section 4(1) exemption for such resales.266
The criteria to determine whether resales are public have been the sub-
ject of some disagreement among commentators. At least one group of
commentators concluded that "only the manner of sale and the number
of purchasers are relevant" to the question of whether resales are pub-
lic.2 67 Logic dictates that in order to avoid public resales, the criteria
established for the section 4(2) private placement exemption2 68 for issu-
ers must be followed by the reselling shareholders.2 69 This means that
there may be no public advertising of the resales, all offerees and pur-
the time it is being used for the reoffer of the securities to the extent it is not already
furnished therein ...."
261. In Stahl, Sidney, SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 23, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
NoAct ifle), the staff expressly recognized that Rule 145 affiliates could resell privately
without the need to comply with the registration provisions of the 1933 Act.
262. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l1) (1982).
263. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (1987); see also supra note 242 and accompanying
text.
264. "Distribution" and "public offering" (or "public sale") are generally considered
synonymous. See Wheat Report, supra note 231, at 161-62; 1 L. Loss, supra note 3, at
551; Orrick, supra note 231, at 350.
265. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987) (emphasis added). For the text of Rule 145(c), see
supra note 1.
266. Section 4(1) of the 1933 Act provides an exemption from registration for offers
and sales by all persons other than an "issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(1) (1982).
267. The Section "4(1-1/2)" Phenomenon: Private Resales of "Restricted" Securities,
34 Bus. Law. 1961, 1976 (1979) [hereinafter The Section 4(1-1/2) Phenomenon].
268. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act exempts from the registration requirements "transac-
tions by an issuer not involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). It is
generally thought that Section 4(2) requires that offerees and purchasers must be able to
evaluate the merits and risks of the investment and must have access to or be supplied
with the same information that would be contained in a registration statement. See. eg.,
Schwartz, Private Offering Exemption: Recent Developments, 37 Ohio St. LJ. 1, 17
(1976).
269. For an example of a case indicating that private resales must be made under con-
ditions similar to those required for a Section 4(2) exemption, see Gilligan, Will & Co. v.
SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466-67 (2d. Cir. 1959). After reviewing the cases dealing with private
resales, one set of commentators stated that "[t]he Purchasers' sophistication and access
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chasers must be sophisticated investors-that is, able to evaluate the
merits and risks of the investment-and the purchasers must have access
to, or be supplied with, the same information that would be contained in
a registration statement.270
These criteria, quite obviously, limit significantly the availability of the
private resale for Rule 145 affiliates. For example, resales may not be
executed in the market through a broker, since such transactions involve
public offers of the securities,2 71 and one, therefore, cannot ensure that all
offerees are sophisticated and have access to information. In addition,
the requirement that information be available to the purchasers of the
Rule 145 affiliate's stock usually involves substantial expense and necessi-
tates cooperation from the issuer, which is the only source of much of
that information. Finally, the requirement that the purchaser be sophis-
ticated obviously and dramatically limits the market for the resale of the
Rule 145 affiliate's stock.
Rule 145 affiliates may also use Rule 145(d) to resell registered Rule
145 stock. Pursuant to subsection (1) of Rule 145(d),2 72 a Rule 145 affili-
ate may resell immediately-that is, without any holding period 273-if
to information appear to have been viewed as essential in five of the six decisions [re-
viewed]." The Section 4(1-1/2) Phenomenon, supra note 267, at 1971.
270. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). One author summarized his conclusions about
private resales as follows:
1. The Purchaser-The purchaser must be financially responsible and there-
fore able to bear the economic risks of his purchase if that investment proves
unsatisfactory. The purchaser must also be a "sophisticated investor" capable
of discerning the merits and risks of his investment....
2. Information Regarding the Issuer-The purchaser must be given all the
relevant information (i.e., that which would be contained in a registration state-
ment) regarding the issuer ... or at least given access to this information....
3. Manner of Sale-[A] seller relying on this exemption cannot publicly so-
licit purchasers through brokers or by means of advertisements offering circu-
lars and the like....
4. Acquisition for Investment-[T]he purchaser in a private sale must agree
to acquire his shares for investment and not with a view to resell or distribute
them.
D. Goldwasser, The Practitioner's Comprehensive Guide to Rule 144, at 390-91 (1975).
Another group of authors summarized their conclusions about private resales as
follows:
1. The appropriate exemptive provision is section 4(1) and not 4(2).
2. No particular holding period is required.
3. The Purchasers' sophistication and access to information appear to have
been viewed as essential in five of the six decisions.
4. The number of purchasers, viewed alone, is not dispositive of the availabil-
ity of an exemption.
5. Restrictions on resales by a purchaser generally have not been required.
6. No decision has articulated an affirmative duty on a Holder to provide re-
gistration-type information to a Purchaser.
The Section 4(1-1/2) Phenomenon, supra note 267, at 1970-71.
271. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
272. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)(1) (1987). For the text of Rule 145(d)(1) see supra note 1.
273. Rule 144 places certain holding period requirements on sellers of restricted securi-
ties. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1987).
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the acquiring company meets the current public information requirement
of Rule 144(C), 2 7 4 if the resales are effected in brokers' transactions, as
defined by Rule 144,275 and if the resales do not during each three-month
period exceed one-percent of the total outstanding shares of the issuer
(that is, the acquiring company).276 In addition, Rule 145(d)(2) permits
unlimited resales after a two-year holding period,277 provided only that
the issuer meets the current public information requirement of Rule
144(d). 27' After a three-year holding period, Rule 145(d)(3) permits
Rule 145 affiliates to resell with no restrictions.279
Rule 145(d) provides workable provisions if a large, publicly traded
company acquires a substantially smaller company in a registered Rule
145 transaction. In such instances the affiliates of the acquired company
are able to meet the resale requirements of Rule 145(d)(1). Furthermore,
because the quantity limitations of Rule 145(d)(1) are a function of the
outstanding stock of the acquiring company, which is assumed to be
much larger than the acquired company, Rule 145 affiliates may be able
to sell all their Rule 145 stock immediately within the one-percent
limitation. 280
274. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (1987). Under Rule 144, an issuer can meet the current
public information requirement either by having filed all reports required under the 1934
Act, if the issuer is reporting either under Section 13 or Section 15(d) or the 1934 Act, or
by causing such information to become "publicly available." Id.
275. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144(f), (g) (1987). To meet the brokers' transaction require-
ment, the sales must, as a practical matter, be made in the market without any solicita-
tion on the part of the selling broker. See id.
276. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1) (1987). Rule 145(d)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)(1)
(1987), incorporates by reference the amount limitations of Rule 144(e), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144(e) (1987), which allow the sale within any three-month period of up to the
greater of one percent of the outstanding stock of the issuer, or the weekly trading volume
of such securities.
277. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)(2) (1987). For the text of Rule 145 see supra note 1.
This provision is not available to a shareholder who is an affiliate of the acquiring com-
pany.
In determining whether one meets the holding period requirements of Rule 145(d)(2)
and (3), the staff, in one no-action response, concluded that one cannot tack the time that
one held the securities of the acquired company. See First NH Banks, SEC No-Action
Letter (available Jan. 23, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file). The staff reached a
contrary result, however, in Saver's Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 4,
1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file). These two responses involve two nearly iden-
tical letters issued on the same day involving two separate acquisitions by the same bank.
278. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)(2) (1987). For the text of Rule 145 see supra note 1.
279. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)(3) (1987). For the text of Rule 145 see supra note 1.
This provision is not available to a shareholder who is an affiliate of the acquiring
company.
280. See supra note 276. For example, assume Alpha Co., which has 1,000 shares of
common stock outstanding, valued at S100 per share, is acquired in a statutory merger by
Beta Co., and that after the acquisition, Beta Co. has 100,000 shares of common stock
outstanding valued at S100 per share. Each share of Alpha is exchanged for one share of
Beta. Immediately after the merger, Mr. Adams, who was the CEO of Alpha and owned
60% (600 shares) of the Alpha stock may, within the quantity limitations of Rule
145(d)(1), immediately resell all his Beta stock, since his 600 shares of Beta stock repre-
sent less than one percent of all outstanding Beta stock.
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Frequently, however, Rule 145(d) may be unavailable to meet the re-
sale needs of Rule 145 affiliates. For example, if the acquiring company
is not actively traded, Rule 145(d)(1) is unavailable, since the resales can-
not be effected in brokers' transactions, as required by Rule 145(d)(1)
and Rule 144(f) and (g).281 If a Rule 145 affiliate holds such stock for
two years, his ability to use Rule 145(d)(2) for resales may still be prob-
lematic, since it may be difficult to meet the current public information
requirement of Rule 145(d)(2) and Rule 144(C).2 8 2
Therefore, Rule 145(d) may not provide workable resale provisions,
especially when small, untraded companies are involved in Rule 145
transactions. In such instances, the easiest solution, at least from the
Rule 145 affiliate's point of view, is a contractual agreement with the
acquiring company that it will register the resales upon request, either by
amendment to the existing registration statement or by filing a new regis-
tration statement if necessary. Otherwise, the Rule 145 affiliate is limited
to a private resale or, after holding the stock for at least two or three
years, to resales under Rule 145(d)(2) or (3), neither of which may be
satisfactory.
D. Resales of Rule 145 Stock Acquired Pursuant to Section 3(a)(9),
Section 3(a)(10) or Regulation A
As discussed above,283 Rule 145 transactions sometimes are structured
to qualify for exemptions from the registration requirements of the 1933
Act ("exempt Rule 145 transactions"). Unfortunately, resales of stock
received in exempt Rule 145 transactions ("exempt Rule 145 stock")
often involve complex and confusing problems for the issuer and the sell-
ing shareholder.
The Commission takes the position that Rule 145 stock acquired pur-
suant to certain exemptions is freely tradable unless the stock is held by
281. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(f), (g); 17 C.F.R. § 145(d)(1) (1987). For the text of
Rule 145 see supra note 1. For a discussion of the inability of shareholders in small
corporations to meet the brokers' transaction requirement, see Campbell, The Plight of
Small Issuers (and Others) Under Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems that Need At-
tention, 74 Ky. L.J. 127, 157 (1985-86).
282. The Commission has indicated that nonreporting companies may meet the "pub-
licly available" requirement by supplying information to shareholders, recognized finan-
cial services and interested dealers and market makers. See Division of Corporation
Finance's Interpretations of Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 5306, Part VI B, Illus-
tration 1, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2705F, at 2815 (Sept. 26, 1972). With regard to
whether the foregoing is the only method by which nonreporting companies can insure
that information is "publicly available," compare Miller & Seltzer, The SEC's New Rule
144, 27 Bus. Law. 1047, 1054 (1972) ("it seems safe to conclude that sending such infor-
mation periodically to the issuer's stockholders will suffice") with Rissman, Rule 144:
Manner of Sale and Availability of Public Information, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 124, 134 (Supp.
1972) ("unless those guidelines can be fully complied with, it would seem advisible for a
broker handling a transaction under Rule 144(c)(2) to obtain interpretation from the SEC
staff before proceeding with the sale").
283. See supra notes 144-64 and accompanying text.
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an affiliate of the acquired or acquiring company2 or unless the transac-
tion is subject to the Commission's "one-percent rule. " 285 The Commis-
sion's position on this matter, however, is apparently limited to the
resale of Rule 145 stock acquired under section 3(a)(9), which is the ex-
emption for certain single company recapitalizations,286 section 3(a)(10),
which is the exemption for transactions affirmed as to fairness by govern-
mental authorities,287 and Regulation A, which is the exemption for
small offerings, best described as a short-form registration. 288 Accord-
ingly, nonaffiliates (except as modified by the one-percent rule) holding
such exempt securities may resell those securities without concern about
registration, holding periods, limitations on the amount of such sales, or
on the types of sales that may be effected, or similar restrictions. 89 Such
resales are exempt under section 4(1) because the selling shareholder is
284. See CommerceAmerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 16, 1985)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (§ 3(a)(9) exemption); Federated Guar. Life Ins. Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 21, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file)
(§ 3(a)(10) exemption); Western Gulf Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug.
26, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (§ 3(a)(10) exemption). Research for this
Article revealed no no-action letter involving resales of Rule 145 stock originally issued in
a Regulation A offering. In a release, however, the Commission stated that, although the
language of Rule 145(d) suggests that it would be inapplicable, Rule 145 affiliates holding
Rule 145 stock issued pursuant to Regulation A, section 3(a)(9) or section 3(a)(10) in fact
could utilize Rule 145(d) for its resales. See Resale of Restricted and Other Securities,
Interpretations of Rules, Release No. 33-6099, Part III, Question 87, 1 Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 2705H, at 2819-27 (Aug., 1979). This indicates that securities purchased under
any of those three exemptions may be resold pursuant to similar rules.
285. For a discussion of the Commission's one-percent rule, see infra notes 307-13 and
accompanying text.
286. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1982). Section 3(a)(9) of the 1933 Act provides an exemp-
tion from registration for "any security exchanged by the issuer with its existing security
holders exclusively where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly
or indirectly for soliciting such exchange." Id.
287. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1982). Section 3(a)(10) of the 1933 Act provides an ex-
emption from registration for
any security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding
securities... where the terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are
approved, after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and conditions at
which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange
shall have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official or agency of the
United States, or by any State or Territorial banking or insurance commission
or other governmental authority expressly authorized by law to grant such
approval.
Id.
288. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982). Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act allows the Commission
by rule to exempt any class of securities "if it finds that the enforcement of this sub-
chapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest ...." Id.
The amount that can be exempted is limited to $5 million. See id. Pursuant to this
authority, the Commission enacted Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 to .264 (1987),
which allows public offerings of up to $1.5 million via the filing of information with the
Commission and the disclosure of information to offerees and purchasers.




not considered an issuer, underwriter or dealer.29 This is, of course, the
same resale privilege allowed nonaffiliates who acquire registered Rule
145 stock.29'
An affiliate of the acquired company, however, is subject to restrictions
with respect to the resale of exempt Rule 145 stock received pursuant to
section 3(a)(9), section 3(a)(10) or Regulation A.292 Specifically, Rule
145(c) provides that such a Rule 145 affiliate becomes an underwriter if
he "publicly offers or sells" the securities.293 As a result, section 4(1),
which exempts- sales by persons other than issuers, underwriters and
dealers, is unavailable for such resales, and affiliates, therefore, must
either register the resales or qualify for another exemption.
If a Rule 145 affiliate holds stock received in a Rule 145 transaction
exempt under section 3(a)(9), section 3(a)(10) or Regulation A, his resale
alternatives are, at least theoretically, the same as a Rule 145 affiliate
holding registered Rule 145 stock.294 Practically, however, the situations
are different.
First, of course, registration is a possibility for a Rule 145 affiliate
wishing to resell such exempt Rule 145 stock. Realistically, this is an
improbable solution due to the costs and difficulty of registering such a
resale. Unlike a registered Rule 145 transaction, there is, with respect to
exempt Rule 145 stock, no existing registration statement that can be
used to effect such resales. In addition, if the issuer of the exempt Rule
145 stock is not a reporting company under the 1934 Act, the informa-
tion may be inaccessible, and the experience necessary to facilitate regis-
tration may be lacking. The cost of registering the resales would,
290. It is difficult to find a direct statement from the Commission affirming that section
4(1) is the basis for the permissibility of such resales. In a number of no-action requests,
however, the requests proffered that section 4(1) is the basis for such resales, and the
Commission, without commenting on the analysis, affirmed the right to resale. See, e.g.,
Western Gulf Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 26, 1982) (LEXIS, Fed-
sec library, NoAct file); Bell Canada, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 2, 1982)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
291. See supra notes 239-82 and accompanying text.
292. See, e.g., First NH Banks, SEC No-Action Letter (available Jan. 23, 1987)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); CommerceAmerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Dec. 16, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Arizona Silver Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter (available July 26, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Metheus
Dev. Partners, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 27, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
NoAct file); Saver's Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 4, 1985) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file).
293. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987). For the text of Rule 145 see supra note 1.
294. Theoretically, affiliates holding registered Rule 145 stock and affiliates holding
exempt Rule 145 stock have purchased securities from an issuer. If, therefore, the affili-
ates of the exempt Rule 145 stock make a "distribution" of the stock, they would appear
to meet the definition of an underwriter within § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1982), just
as affiliates with registered Rule 145 stock would meet the definition. See supra notes
240-43 and accompanying text. Accordingly, both affiliates holding registered Rule 145
stock and affiliates holding exempt Rule 145 stock must either register the resales or
structure the sales in ways that are outside the definition of "underwriter," enabling them
to retain the Section 4(1) exemption.
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therefore, be significant and would eliminate the savings recognized by
the original exemption for the Rule 145 transaction.
Rule 145 affiliates holding stock acquired pursuant to section 3(a)(9),
section 3(a)(10) or Regulation A also may resell under section (d) of Rule
145.295 Although that section appears on its face to be limited to resales
of "registered securities,"'2 96 the Commission takes the position that Rule
145(d) is available for resales of such exempt Rule 145 stock.297
The availability of Rule 145(d) for resales of such exempt Rule 145
stock, however, is subject to the same practical limitations discussed ear-
lier with regard to resales of registered Rule 145 stock.298 If the issuer
(the acquiring company) is reporting under the 1934 Act and is traded in
an organized market, Rule 145(d) provides a workable framework for
immediate resales, within the amount limitations of Rule 144,299 and un-
limited resales after a two-year holding period.3" If, on the other hand,
the issuer (the acquiring company) is not reporting under the 1934 Act
and not traded actively, Rule 145(d) may, for the reason previously de-
scribed, effectively require a three-year holding period.30'
In any event, the Commission does not allow tacking in computing the
holding period for Rule 145(d).302 Accordingly, the holding period for a
Rule 145 affiliate under Rule 145(d)(2) or (3) runs from the Rule 145
transaction and not from the time the Rule 145 affiliate acquired the
stock in the acquired company. 30
3
A private resale is another alternative for an affiliate holding Rule 145
295. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (1987) (resale provisions for persons deemed underwriters
under Rule 145).
296. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (1987). Rule 145(d) states that an affiliate shall not be
considered "an underwriter of registered securities" if the conditions of the rule are met.
Id. For the text of Rule 145 see note 1, supra.
297. See Resale of Restricted and Other Securities, Interpretations of Rules, Release
No. 33-6099, Part III, Question 87, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) " 2705H, at 2819-27
(Aug. 2, 1979); First NH Banks, SEC No-Action Letter (available Jan. 23, 1987)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Hadson Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Feb. 10, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Metheus Dev. Partners,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 27, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file);
Saver's Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 28, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, NoAct fie); Old Stone Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 19, 1984)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Western Gulf Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Aug. 26, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
298. See supra notes 272-82 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 273, 275 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 273-79 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying discussion.
302. See supra note 277.
303. See, eg., Bank of New Hampshire, SEC No-Action Letter (available June 12,
1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); First NH Banks, SEC No-Action Letter
(available Jan. 23, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Convergent Technologies,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 29, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file).
In computing the applicability of Rule 145(d)(3) to resales of Rule 145 stock by a bank,
the Commission allowed a bank that was the pledgee of Rule 145 stock to tack its
pledgor's holding period from the date of the Rule 145 transaction, but not the pledgor's
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stock acquired pursuant to section 3(a)(9), section 3(a)(10) or Regulation
A.3" The requirements imposed on such resales,3 °5 however, may be
burdensome.
The most apparent difficulty in such resales is meeting the disclosure
requirements, as it may be expensive and time consuming to gather and
disclose the same information that would be contained in a registration
statement. Especially in instances where the issuer is not a reporting
company under the 1934 Act, which often may be the case in exempt
Rule 145 transactions, the company may not have the annual reports,
proxy statements, 10-K's 306 and other documents that can be accessible
sources for such disclosures. From an issuer's point of view, therefore,
the cost of preparing such disclosures may destroy all the cost savings
resulting from initially avoiding registration and may move the total
costs of the transaction into an unacceptable range.
Superimposed upon this entire analysis is the Commission's one-per-
cent rule, which essentially provides that shareholders ("one-percent
shareholders") who, pursuant to certain exempt Rule 145 transac-
tions, 30 7 receive more than one-percent of the issuer's outstanding stock
may resell such securities only 0 ' by meeting the requirements of sections
(c), (e), (f) and (g) of Rule 144.309 This limitation on resales applies even
though the one-percent shareholder is an affiliate of neither the acquired
company nor the acquiring company M and thus not an underwriter
within the meaning of Rule 145(c).3 '
The Commission, however, will not apply the constraints of the one-
holding period prior to the Rule 145 transaction. See Kapok Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter (available Jan. 23, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
304. The Commission specifically recognized the availability of private resales in Stahl,
Sidney, SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 23, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file).
305. See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
306. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1987). Form 10-K is the annual report filed with the
SEC by 1934 Act reporting companies.
307. See infra notes 314-17, 340 and accompanying text.
308. Notwithstanding any indications by the Commission to the contrary, it is clear
that there are other resale options available to such shareholders. See infra discussion at
notes 322-28.
309. See, e.g., Hadson Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 10,
1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Western Gulf Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter (available Aug. 26, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Spencer R. Collins
Charitable Trusts, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 5, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, NoAct file).
Section (c) requires adequate currently available public information, see 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144(c) (1987), section (e) places limits on the amount of securities that may be sold,
see id. at § 230.144(e), section (f) describes the manner in which a sale may be made, see
id. at § 230.144(f), and section (g) delineates the types of resale transactions that are
permissible as brokers' transactions covered in § 4(4) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4)
(1982); see 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(g) (1987).
310. See, e.g., Western Gulf Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 26,
1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Bell Canada, SEC No-Action Letter (avail-
able Aug, 2, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
311. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987).
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percent rule if all of the following three conditions are met: (1) the Rule
145 transaction was exempt from registration pursuant to section
3(a)(10), (2) in the course of the Rule 145 transaction, disclosures com-
parable to those required by the proxy rules of section 14 of the 1934 Act
were made to shareholders of the acquired company, and (3) the issuer
(the acquiring company) is subject to the 1934 Act's reporting
requirements.31 2
The one-percent rule apparently is based on the theory that these one-
percent shareholders who resell their Rule 145 stock are underwriters
within the meaning of section 2(11) of the 1933 Act3' 3 and thus must find
an exemption for their proposed resales. The one-percent rule, therefore,
represents an attempt by the Commission to control the methods of re-
sale used by shareholders holding substantial amounts of Rule 145 stock.
Although one may have a certain sympathy for the predicament of the
Commission in dealing with this problem, the uncertainty in the rule's
application is troubling. For example, while it is clear that the one-per-
cent rule applies to resales of Rule 145 stock acquired pursuant to section
3(a)(10), 314 research for this Article uncovered no examples of an appli-
cation of the one-percent rule to resales of Rule 145 stock acquired pur-
suant to Regulation A or section 3(a)(9).3 5  Because, however, the
Commission generally treats section 3(a)(9), section 3(a)(10) and Regula-
tion A similarly for Rule 145 purposes, 3 16 it is likely that the Commis-
sion would apply both the one-percent rule and the exception to the one-
percent rule to resales of Rule 145 stock acquired under any of these
three exemptions."'
In addition, it is not entirely clear how one measures the normative
one-percent. Is it, for example, one-percent of the total of all outstanding
securites, one-percent of the total outstanding shares of the class of secur-
312. See, eg., Hadson Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 10,
1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Pegasus Gold, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Aug. 20, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Bell Canada, SEC No-
Action Letter (available Aug. 2, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Spencer R.
Collins Charitable Trusts, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 5, 1982) (LEXIS, Fed-
sec library, NoAct file); HRS Indus., SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 1, 1982)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Stampede Int'l Resources, Northwest Ventures,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Jan. 4, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
313. See, e.g., Pegasus Gold Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 20, 1984)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (Inquiry-l); International Plasma Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (available Aug. 30, 1974) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
314. See the no-action letters cited supra note 309.
315. Research for this Article uncovered no examples of the Commission's application
of the one-percent rule to resales of registered securities, although it appears that some
counsel assume--or at least fear-its applicability. See supra notes 248, 254.
316. See supra notes 284-91 and accompanying text.
317. The one-percent rule appears to have no application to resales of Rule 145 stock
acquired pursuant to Regulation D or Section 4(2). For a discussion of the resale restric-
tions applicable to such stock, see infra discussion accompanying notes 345-61. Simi-
larly, research for this Article uncovered no application of the one-percent rule to the
resale of Rule 145 stock acquired pursuant to the section 3(a)(l 1) intrastate exemption
and Rule 147. See infra discussion accompanying note 341.
1987]
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ities issued in the Rule 145 transaction, or one-percent of the shares is-
sued in the Rule 145 transaction? Although language in certain no-
action letters suggests that the Commission sometimes uses the third al-
ternative,31 8 it appears that the Commission generally uses the second
alternative to calculate the one-percent. 3 ' 9 That alternative has the ad-
vantage of avoiding the computational problems of the first alternative 32
0
and the unnecessary restrictiveness of the third alternative. 321
Finally, if a security holder is caught by the one-percent rule, it is not
entirely clear what resale provisions are available. Although the Com-
mission's no-action letters indicate that resales by such one-percent
shareholders may be made pursuant to the same requirements as Rule
145(d)(1), 322 research for this Article failed to uncover any no-action let-
ters permitting resales pursuant to Rule 145(d)(2),323 which allows re-
sales after a two-year holding period if the issuer meets the current public
information requirement of Rule 144,324 or permitting resale pursuant to
Rule 145(d)(3), which allows resales after a three-year holding period.325
Logic and consistency, however, dictate the availability of these resale
provisions for persons caught by the one-percent rule. The one-percent
rule, like Rule 145(c), is an attempt by the Commission to identify per-
318. See, e.g., Bank of Highland, SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 8, 1984)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (one-percent of the holding company stock "issued
in the exchange"); Mutual Trust Bank, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 20, 1984)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (one-percent "issued in the exchange"). In each of
the foregoing examples, however, it appears that one-percent of the issue was the same as
one-percent of the total outstanding stock.
319. See, e.g., Hadson Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 10,
1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Stampede Int'l Resources, SEC No-Action
Letter (available Jan. 4, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Western Gulf Fin.
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 26, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file); Spencer R. Collins Charitable Trusts, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 5, 1982)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
320. For example, how would one compute the total outstanding securities when the
issuer has more than one class of securities?
321. If the norm used were the third alternative, one-percent of the shares issued in the
Rule 145 transaction, the norm would be especially restrictive when, for example, a large
issuer with 10,000,000 common shares outstanding issued 10,000 common shares in a
Rule 145 transaction. It would seem unwarranted to impose any resale restrictions, since
the stock involved would represent such a small part of the total outstanding shares of the
issuer.
322. The no-action letters require that the selling shareholder meet the provisions of
subsections (c), (e), (f) and (g) of Rule 144, which are incorporated into Rule 145(d)(1),
17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)(1) (1987). See, e.g., Hadson Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter (available Feb. 10, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Bank of Highland,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 8, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Mu-
tual Trust Bank, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 20, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, NoAct file); Pegasus Gold, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 20, 1984)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Western Gulf Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Aug. 26, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); HRS Indus., SEC No-
Action Letter (available Apr. 1, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
323. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)(2) (1987).
324. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (1987).
325. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)(3) (1987). For the text of Rule 145 see supra note 1.
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sons holding Rule 145 stock who may make resales of such significant
size as to be troublesome. Both, also, are based on the concept that pub-
lic resales cause the selling shareholders to become underwriters. It,
therefore, would be anomalous, both conceptually and practically, to
deny the one-percent shareholders access to the same Rule 145(d) resale
provisions permitted the Rule 145 affiliate.
Private resales326 also should be available to the one-percent share-
holders. As stated earlier, the conceptual basis for the one-percent rule is
the underwriter status of persons who publicly resell exempt Rule 145
stock.327 If, therefore, a security holder subject to the one-percent rule
resells privately, he cannot be considered an underwriter, since he would
not be engaging in a distribution.328 As a result, such resales by the one-
percent shareholder would be exempt under the provisions of section 4(1)
of the 1933 Act.
In addition to its vagueness, the one-percent rule amounts to adminis-
trative overkill. Rule 145(c) contains its own, unique definition of under-
writer, the purpose of which, presumably, is to limit large resales. It
therefore, seems unnecessary, unfair and confusing to have a second defi-
nition of underwriter, the one-percent rule, designed to effect the same
purpose as Rule 145(c). What is needed here is a consistent, fair and
clearly promulgated rule defining the limitations on resales of exempt
Rule 145 stock.
E. Resales of Rule 145 Stock Issued Pursuant
to the Intrastate Exemption
When an acquiring company uses Rule 147,329 the intrastate exemp-
tion, as a means to avoid registration of a Rule 145 transaction, resale
limitations are complicated by the interplay between the two rules. Es-
sentially, such Rule 145 stock can become doubly restricted, subject to
the resale limitations of both Rule 145 and Rule 147.
Rule 147(e)3 3 ° contains resale limitations designed to ensure that stock
offered under Rule 147 comes to rest in the hands of local investors who
have access to information about the issuer. 3 ' Accordingly, for nine
326. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
329. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1987). In addition to Rule 147, it is possible to fall within
the intrastate exemption by complying with the common law requirements that have
developed under § 3(a)(1 1) of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(I 1) (1982). These re-
quirements, however, are so uncertain that, as a practical matter, it is nearly impossible
to rely on the common law of § 3(a)(1 1). See Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146
and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registration for the
Sale of Securities, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 622, 649 (1974); Campbell, supra note 150, at 1165-
66. As a result, this Author discusses only Rule 147 herein.
330. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1987) (all resales must be made to residents within state
or territory).
331. The intrastate exemption and Rule 147 appear to be based, at least in part, on the
geographic proximity of the issuer and investor, which, it is thought, provides the inves-
19871
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months after the completion of an offering under Rule 147, holders may
resell only to persons who are residents of the same state as the issuer.332
Thereafter, Rule 147 imposes no limitation on resales.3 33
The specific resale limitations contained in Rule 147, however, are not
the only applicable limitations. Rule 145(c) also contains resale restric-
tions. Specifically, anyone who is an affiliate of the acquired company
becomes an underwriter if that Rule 145 affiliate "publicly offers or sells"
Rule 145 stock.3 34 Thus, to avoid underwriter status and the loss of the
section 4(1) exemption, the Rule 145 affiliate must either make his resales
privately 335 or sell pursuant to the terms of Rule 145(d).336
The position of the Commission is that the resale limitations of both
Rule 145(c) and Rule 147 are applicable to the resale of Rule 145 stock
acquired in a transaction exempt under Rule 147.13 ' Accordingly, for
the first nine months following such a transaction, Rule 145 affiliates, in
order to comply with the resale restrictions of Rule 147(e), are limited to
intrastate sales only and in order to avoid the restrictions imposed by
Rule 145(c), must sell either privately or pursuant to Rule 145(d).
Nonaffiliates holding such stock may sell during that nine-month period
only to persons resident in the same state as the acquiring company, be-
cause such resales are subject to the resale limitations of Rule 147(e).
Such nonaffiliates, however, are not subject to the resale restrictions of
Rule 145 because they are not underwriters under Rule 145(c). 33a After
the nine-month period, the limitations of Rule 147(e) expire. Accord-
tor with access to information about the issuer, thus relieving the need to mandate disclo-
sure. Along these lines, one commentator has stated:
The following reasons have been offered from time to time in support of the
intrastate exemption: (1) In terms of economic policy, it is useful to allow se-
curities offerings by a small businessman to his friends, relatives, business asso-
ciates, and others, without federal restrictions; (2) registration for such small
offerings would, as a practical matter, be almost impossible; (3) investors in
local financings are protected by the sanctions of public opinion; (4) such inves-
tors are protected by their proximity to the issuer; (5) such investors are pro-
tected by state regulation; and (6) intrastate offerings do not present questions
of national interest.
Hicks, Intrastate Offering Under Rule 147, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 499 (1974) (footnotes
omitted).
332. Rule 147(e) provides:
During the period in which securities that are part of an issue are being offered
and sold by the issuer, and for a period of nine months from the date of the last
sale by the issuer of such securities, all resales of any part of the issue, by any
person, shall be made only to persons resident within such state or territory.
17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1987).
333. See id.
334. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987). For the text of Rule 145(c) see supra note 1.
335. See supra notes 261-70 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 272-82 and accompanying text.
337. See, e.g., Hungry Tiger Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 27, 1982)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); United Virginia Bankshares, SEC No-Action Letter
(available Feb. 13, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
338. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987) (underwriters defined as those who resell pub-
licly, or who are affiliates).
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ingly, stock held by nonaffidiates is freely tradable,339 while stock held by
Rule 145 affiliates continues to be subject to the resale limitations of Rule
145.
In addition, the Commission may impose its one-percent rule 3 ° on
resales of Rule 145 stock acquired in transactions exempt under Rule
147. The practical impact of this would be to expand the definition of
underwriter to include any shareholder of the acquired company who
received one-percent of the Rule 145 stock, if such shareholder publicly
resells such Rule 145 stock.34 1 This one-percent rule would apply both
during and after the nine-month limitation imposed by Rule 147.2
Certainly it makes no sense to apply the one-percent rule to such situa-
tions. As described earlier, the one-percent rule represents administra-
tive overkill,343 and its application is even less defensible in a situation
where both Rule 145(c) and Rule 147 already limit resales. Nonetheless,
research for this Article failed to uncover any no-action letters on the
application of the one-percent rule in such resales, and thus there is at
least some risk that the Commission would apply it.
Even without the one-percent rule, however, there is no legitimate rea-
son for imposing dual resale restrictions of Rule 145(c) and Rule 147 on
the resale of Rule 145 stock acquired in a transaction exempt under Rule
147. Standing alone, the resale provisions of Rule 147 are entirely ade-
quate to ensure that legitimate policy goals of the 1933 Act are met, be-
cause Rule 147 requires that the stock comes to rest in the hands of local
investors who presumably have access to information about the com-
pany. 3" The Commission considers this limitation to be appropriate for
the Rule 147 exemption in non-Rule 145 situations, and there is no basis
for concluding otherwise in a Rule 145 transaction.
F. Resales of Rule 145 Stock Issued Pursuant to Section 4(2) or
Regulation D
As a conceptual matter, the resale of Rule 145 stock acquired in a
339. Although no no-action letter directly states this proposition, it is clear from Rule
147(e) itself. In one response, however, the Commission did not challenge the statement
by the requesting attorney that "non-affiliates ... following the satisfaction of Rule 147(e)
would be able to resell the securities acquired in the merger transaction without restric-
tion." United Virginia Bankshares, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 13, 1978)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
340. For a discussion of the one-percent rule as applied to resales of other exempt Rule
145 stock, see supra notes 307-24 and accompanying text.
341. Although the Commission has never explained the theoretical basis for the one-
percent rule, it appears, as described earlier, that it is founded on the notion that persons
acquiring one-percent of the Rule 145 stock become underwriters if they resell publicly.
See supra discussion accompanying notes 312-14.
342. This is because one's status as an "underwriter" would be unaffected by the nine-
month limitation.
343. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
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transaction by the issuer exempt under section 4(2)14 5 or Regulation
D,346 ("restricted securities") is relatively simple. Essentially, resales of
restricted securities acquired in a Rule 145 transaction ("restricted Rule
145 stock") are subject only to the provisions governing the resale of
restricted securities generally and are not, therefore, subject to any addi-
tional limitations on resales imposed by Rule 145(c) or any other admin-
istrative interpretation. A bit of analysis, however, is required to reach
this result.
Persons holding any restricted securities have three alternatives for re-
sale without registration. First, resales may be made in private transac-
tions, as described earlier in this Article.347 Second, restricted securities
may be resold pursuant to Rule 144, if the holder meets all the conditions
of that Rule, including the holding period requirement of section (d).34 a
Finally, it may be possible to effect public resales outside the provisions
of Rule 144349 ("common law public resale exemption"). Although the
availability of the common law public resale exemption has become
somewhat clouded in recent years,350 if the holder establishes that the
restricted securities were acquired with the proper investment intent,
345. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982) (exempting transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering).
346. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .506 (1987).
347. See supra notes 261-71 and accompanying text.
348. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1987).
349. See generally 1 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 665-73; Volk & Schneider, The Sale of
Restricted Securities Outside of Rule 144, in Eighth Annual Institute of Securities Regula-
tion 135-48 (1977); Wheat Report, supra note 231, at 160-77.
350. This resulted from the Commission's release adopting Rule 144, see Securities Act
Release No. 5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,487, at
81,049 (Jan. 11, 1972), in which the the Commission stated: (1) "the 'change in circum-
stances' concept should no longer be considered as one of the factors in determining
whether a person is an underwriter," id. at 81,050-51; (2) "the fact that securities have
been held for a particular period of time does not by itself establish the availability of an
exemption from registration," id. at 81,051; (3) "the staff will not issue no-action letters
relating to resales of such [restricted] securities," id. at 81,050; and (4) persons making
sales of restricted securities outside Rule 144 "will have a substantial burden of proof in
establishing that an exemption from registration is available for such offers or sales ......
Id.
The practical impact of this pronouncement was to limit significantly public resales
outside Rule 144. See Lipton, Fogelson & Warnken, Rule 144-A Summary Review Af-
ter Two Years, 29 Bus. Law. 1183 (1974), wherein the authors state:
In view of the strong policy statements of the SEC in Release No. 5223 .... it
would appear that counsel may render favorable opinions as to sales outside the
Rule of post-144 restricted securities only in very limited situations-those
where the issuer is a major listed company, the amount can be sold readily
without material effect on the market ... and there has been a holding period
substantially more than two years (probably in the area of three to five years).
Substantially the same standards are applicable to pre-144 restricted securities,
except that the current three-year holding period is generally considered ade-
quate. Most lawyers will not give an opinion in either situation where the com-
pany is marginal or the amount of securities cannot be readily absorbed by the
normal trading market, no matter what the holding period.
Id. at 1198.
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public resale of restricted securities is possible.3"' This, in turn, probably
requires a sufficient holding period, perhaps three years,35 2 or the availa-
bility of the change-in-circumstances doctrine.353
By meeting the requirements of any of these three resale alternatives, a
selling shareholder falls outside the definition of underwriter and thus
retains the section 4(1) exemption. Specifically, if resales are made pri-
vately or pursuant to Rule 144, the resales do not involve a "distribu-
tion." '354 If resales are made pursuant to the common law public resale
exemption, then the person selling the restricted securities, although en-
gaged in a distribution,355 is not considered as having "purchased ...
with a view to ... distribution ....
These same alternatives are also available to protect persons selling
restricted Rule 145 stock. Thus, if an affiliate of the acquired company,
who may become an underwriter under Rule 145(c), or a one-percent
shareholder, who may become an underwriter under the one-percent
rule, sells restricted Rule 145 stock privately or pursuant to Rule 144 or
the common law public resale exemption, the selling shareholder does
not fall within the definition of underwriter. This first protects the selling
shareholder from the requirements of Rule 145(c) and the one-percent
rule since the constraint of these rules applies only if the selling share-
holders are underwriters, and second ensures the availability of a section
4(1) exemption, since the selling shareholder is not an issuer, underwriter
or dealer.
This analysis appears consistent with the small number of Commission
interpretations available. Specifically, in a 1979 release, the Commission
refused to allow the use of Rule 145(d) for the resales of restricted Rule
145 stock. 357 A contrary result would have allowed such resales under
351. By establishing that the restricted securities were acquired for investment, the
holder will not be considered as having "purchased... with a view to ... distribution"
and thus will fall outside the definition of "underwriter" in § 2(11) of the 1933 Act. 15
U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982). This, then, insures the availability of the § 4(1) exemption for
such resales. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1982) (exempting transactions by persons other
than issuers, underwriters or dealers). See generally authorities cited supra note 350 for a
discussion of these matters.
352. See Campbell, supra note 281, at 153-55.
353. The basis of the change-in-circumstances doctrine is a change in the selling share-
holder's circumstances that reconciles an original investment intent with the subsequent
public distribution. Thus, although the selling shareholder "purchased from an issuer"
and subsequently made a "distribution," he is considered not to have purchased with a
"view to distribution." Instead, he purchased, it is assumed, with an original investment
intent (that is, without a "view to distribution"), but changed his intent because of
changed circumstances. This keeps the selling shareholder outside the section 2(11) defi-
nition of underwriter. See generally Wheat Report, supra note 231, at 166-70; T. Hazen,
supra note 213, at 146-47.
354. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b) (1987). With regard to private resales, see The Section 4(1
1/2) Phenomenon, supra note 267, at 1961.
355. See Campbell, supra note 281, at 151-52.
356. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I1) (1982).
357. Resale of Restricted and Other Securities, Interpretations of Rules, Release No.
33-6099, Part III, Question 87, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 2705H, at 2819-27 (Aug. 2,
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terms more favorable than those generally available for the resale of
other restricted securities, since Rule 145(d)(1), unlike Rule 144, imposes
no holding period for resales.35 The implication, therefore, is that such
restricted Rule 145 stock must be sold under the normal resale provisions
available for restricted securities generally.
Consistent with its position in related situations, the Commission has
concluded that tacking is not permitted for restricted Rule 145 stock.3 59
Accordingly, in the Latoka, Inc. & Itasca, Inc. no-action letter,36° the
Commission stated that the Rule 144(d) holding period for Rule 145
stock acquired under the exemption provided by section 4(2) runs from
the date of the Rule 145 transaction, not from the date the shareholder
purchased his or her stock in the acquired company. 36'
G. Resales of Rule 145 Stock Issued in Exchange for Restricted Stock
In a Rule 145 transaction, part, or all, of the shares of the acquired
company may be subject, at the time of the Rule 145 transaction, to re-
sale limitations, such as those imposed by section 4(2),362 Regulation
D, 3 6 3 Rule 147 364 or Rule 145(d).3 65  The question therefore arises
whether such pre-existing limitations on resale apply to the new, Rule
145 stock.
If the Rule 145 transaction is registered, the position of the Commis-
sion is that the registration cleanses any existing restrictions on the
shares.366 As a result, the Rule 145 stock is freely tradable, subject only
1979). This release appears to reverse a prior position of the Commission. See Ward
Foods, SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 19, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file).
358. Rule 145(d)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)(1) (1987), does not require compliance
with the holding period in Rule 144(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1987), if sections (c), (e),
(f) and (g) of Rule 144, id. at § 230.144(c)-(g), pertaining to availability of information
about the company, amount of securities sold, and manner of sale, are met.
359. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
360. See Latoka, Inc. & Itasca, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available June 15, 1987)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file).
361. See id.
362. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). For a discussion of these limitations, see Camp-
bell, supra note 281, at 147-62.
363. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1987) (securities acquired under Regulation D have
the same status as those acquired under section 4(2)).
364. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1987) (during the offering, and for nine months from
the last sale, all resales may be made only to residents within the state).
365. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (incorporating the resale limitations of Rule 144(c)-
(g), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c)-(g) (1987)). Although the no-action responses cited in this
section involve pre-existing resale limitations imposed by § 4(2), see supra note 362, and
by Rule 145(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987), logic and consistency indicate that a simi-
lar response would be appropriate in instances where the pre-existing resale limitation is
imposed by any other section or rule under the 1933 Act: including § 3(a)(l 1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(1 1) (1982); Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1987); and Regulation D, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.501 to .506 (1987), or § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1982).
366. See, e.g., Kaneb Serv., SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 9, 1981) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file) (securities restricted pursuant to Rule 145(c)); Division of
Corporation Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related Matters, Securities Act
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to the limitations in Rule 145(d) discussed earlier in the Article.367
If, on the other hand, the Rule 145 transaction qualifies for an exemp-
tion from the registration requirements, 368 the Commission's view is that
the pre-existing resale restrictions continue to apply to the newly issued
Rule 145 stock.369 The Commission, however, does permit tacking37 ° in
such instances. 371 Again, this raises the possibility of multiple limitations
on resale. Assume, for example, that an affiliate of an acquired company
holds securities that are subject to the resale limitations of Rule 147 and
that these securities are exchanged in a Rule 145 transaction, which
transaction is exempt from registration under section 3(a)(10). The se-
curities received in the Rule 145 transaction continue to be subject to the
resale limitations of Rule 147(e) and, because of the affiliate status of the
selling shareholder, are subject also to the resale limitations imposed by
Rule 145(c).
H. Resales of Rule 145 Stock by Control Persons
of the Acquiring Company
To complete this discussion, mention should be made of the limitations
applicable to the resale of Rule 145 stock held by control persons of the
acquiring company ("acquiring company control persons"). Generally,
for the purposes of section 2(11) of the 1933 Act, 372 a control person is
included in the definition of "issuer. ' 37 3 Accordingly, if an acquiring
company control person publicly sells any acquiring company stock, in-
cluding Rule 145 stock, through, for example, a broker, the broker is
selling for an "issuer." Both the broker, who is then considered an un-
derwriter, since he is selling for an issuer in connection with a distribu-
tion, and the control person, who is considered an issuer, lose their
Release No. 5463, Part IV, Illustration A, Question A-4, I Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) C
3058, at 3067-7 to 3067-8 (Feb. 28, 1974) (securities previously acquired in a private
offering).
367. See supra notes 239-82 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 142-72 and accompanying text.
369. See, e.g., Convergent Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec.
29, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); CommerceAmerica Corp., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (available Dec. 16, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Oracle Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter (available June 17, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file);
Federated Guar. Life Ins. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 21, 1983) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, NoAct file).
370. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
371. See, e.g., Convergent Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec.
29, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Metheus Dev. Partners, SEC No-Action
Letter (available March 27, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file); Federated Guar.
Life Ins. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 21, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
NoAct file). Thus, in determining whether a proposed sale of such Rule 145 stock meets
the resale requirements of Rule 144, which may be one method to satisfy the preexisting
restrictions, the Rule 144(d) holding period includes the time prior to the Rule 145 trans-
action that the shareholder owned the restricted secruities and the time the shareholder
held the new Rule 145 stock.
372. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1982) (defining "underwriter").
373. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982).
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section 4(1) exemptions and thus are subject to the registration require-
ments of the 1933 Act.37 4
The options available for sale of Rule 145 stock by an acquiring com-
pany control person are essentially the same as those available to any
controlling shareholder selling non-Rule 145 stock.37 5 The Commission
has concluded, however, that resales of Rule 145 stock by such control
shareholders cannot be made under Rule 145(d),376 although often there
may be little difference between the requirements of Rule 144 and Rule
145(d).
III. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
It is easy to criticize Rule 145. For example, one is able to find irrec-
oncilable Commission interpretations of the Rule, such as the Commis-
sion's position that a change from a corporation to a Massachusetts
business trust is within the change-in-domicile exception, while a change
to a corporation from a Massachusetts business trust is not within the
change-in-domicile exception. 377 Also for example, the staff gave incon-
sistent answers to the question whether an offer was involved when a
cash tender offer was announced in connection with a stock-for-stock
merger.378
In addition to inconsistencies, a number of the Commission's interpre-
tations of Rule 145 simply are unsound. For example, the definition of
underwriter in Rule 145(C) 3 79 and the Commission's one-percent rule
380
are overly broad, imposing unjustified limitations on the freedom to resell
Rule 145 stock.381 The Commission also incorrectly concludes that a
merger interposing a holding company between the operating company
374. T. Hazen, supra note 352, at 147-49. For discussions of sales by control persons,
see 1 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 556-57.
Securities held by affiliates of the aquiring company may be the subject of multiple
limitations on resale. For example, if the Rule 145 transaction were effectuated pursuant
to the exemption provided by Rule 147, resales would be limited because of the control
status of the acquiring company control person and because of the the resale limitations
of Rule 147(e).
375. An acquiring company control person may sell pursuant to a registration state-
ment, pursuant to the intrastate exemption provided by § 3(a)(l 1), see Exemption for
Local Offerings from Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 2274, at 2609 (Dec. 6, 1961), pursuant to Rule 144, see 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144 (1987) (exemption for small sales by a controlling shareholder), or privately,
see The Section 4(1 1/2) Phenomenon, supra note 267, at 1976-77.
376. See Division of Corporation Finance's Interpretations of Rule 145 and Related
Matters, Securities Act Release No. 5463, Part IV, Illustration A, Question A-l, I Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3058, at 3067-7 (Feb. 28, 1974).
377. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
379. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987).
380. See supra notes 307-27 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 313-28 (dis-
cussing problems arising from use of the one-percent rule).
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and its shareholders necessarily involves a sale of securities.382 It is also
unsound conceptually for the Commission to conclude that a spin-off in-
volves a sale of securities to nonvoting shareholders 383 and for the Com-
mission to conclude that a sale of assets by an acquired company in
exchange for stock of the acquiring company involves a sale of stock only
if the stock is distributed to the shareholders of the acquired company. a m
Rule 145 also has been plagued by the breakdown of the categories
delineated in section (a) of the Rule. Most apparently, the change-in-
domicile exception in Rule 145(a)(2) has been interpreted to include
transactions that do not fit the language of the exception. 85 Further-
more, as demonstrated by the preceding discussion, none of the Rule
145(a) categories can be relied upon in all instances. Rather, one often is
required to engage in additional analyses before determining whether an
amalgamation or a reclassification involves a sale of securities to the
shareholders of the acquired company. 86
The Commission also is subject to criticism for its occasional reliance
upon conceptually indefensible, pragmatic solutions to Rule 145
problems. For example, in a spin-off situation that, under the Commis-
sion's interpretations, would involve a sale, the Commission concluded
that no registration or applicable exemption is required as long as the
transaction is accompanied by a 1934 Act proxy statement and the spun-
off company becomes subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934
Act.38 7 Although pragmatically one may conclude that there is no need
for additional disclosure in such instances, such a result is entirely incon-
sistent with the 1933 Act. If the transaction is a sale, registration or an
exemption from registration is required. Furthermore, the existence of
the proxy statement and the company's reporting requirements are irrele-
vant to the presence of a sale under the 1933 Act.
To address these problems, the Commission should substantially revise
Rule 145. In connection with this undertaking, the Commission needs to
recognize that the 1933 Act provides no basis for conceptual distinctions
between the amalgamations and recapitalizations included in Rule 145
and other transactions outside Rule 145. Thus, the criteria for determin-
ing the existence of a sale should be the same in Rule 145 transactions
and non-Rule 145 transactions. Similarly, the rules regarding the obliga-
tion to register a transaction, the availability of exemptions from the re-
gistration requirements and the limitations on resales should be the same
for Rule 145 transactions and non-Rule 145 transactions.
382. For a discussion of the Commission's position in this regard, see supra notes 77-88
and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
386. For example, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text which suggests that
reverse stock splits may involve sales in certain instances, notwithstanding language in
Rule 145(a)(1) to the contrary.
387. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
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A need exists, however, for special administrative accomodations for
Rule 145 transactions. Thus, for example, it is entirely appropriate for
the Commission to provide safe harbor provisions, such as Rule
145(b),388 for announcement of a Rule 145 transaction, and to provide a
special registration form, such as Form S-4,389 for the registration of
Rule 145 transactions.
With regard to more specific recommendations, this Author suggests
that the Commission abandon its attempt in Rule 145 to establish dis-
crete and absolute categories of sale and no-sale transactions. Instead,
Rule 145(a) should state that a reclassification, merger, consolidation or
transfer of assets involves a sale of securities to voting shareholders who
receive stock in the transaction only if the transaction results in a mate-
rial change in the corporation or in shareholders' rights. Applying this
standard, the Rule then should list certain alterations that usually do or
do not result in a sale. For example, it would seem appropriate to state
that in most circumstances reclassifications involving only a stock split,
reverse stock split or change in par value of securities would not involve
a sale, since such transactions usually involve only immaterial changes in
shareholders' rights. As another example, it also seems appropriate to
state that reclassifications involving any material change in dividend, liq-
uidation, redemption or conversion rights in most circumstances would
involve a sale, because they involve material changes in fundamental
shareholder rights.
Although such an approach at first appears to destroy the certainty of
Rule 145(a), the opposite, in fact, results. As described earlier, the cate-
gories of Rule 145(a) never have been absolute, and the apparent attempt
by the Commission in Rule 145(a) to treat them as such has caused con-
fusion and disingenuous analyses. The Commission should admit this
and change the rule to allow the definition of a sale to develop from a
sound, although somewhat general, conceptual basis.
In addition to the problem of defining sale, it is clear that the resale
provision of Rule 145110 and the one-percent rule39 1 are unjustifiably re-
strictive392 and accordingly require substantial adjustment. This, how-
ever, forms one part of a larger problem that the Commission needs to
treat on a unified basis.
Anytime a shareholder proposes to resell securities acquired from an
issuer in a registered or exempt transaction, the question arises whether
such selling shareholder is an underwriter.393 Statutorily, such a resel-
ling shareholder is an underwriter if he purchased the shares with a view
388. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(b) (1987).
389. 17 C.F.R. § 239.25 (1987).
390. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (1987).
391. See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 248-55, 327-28 and accompanying text.




The application of this definition, however, has resulted in confusion
and inconsistency. For example, Rule 145(c)395 subjects any affiliate of
an acquired company to the possibility of underwriter status,39 6 while the
one-percent rule subjects persons who purchase one-percent of a Rule
145 offering to underwriter status.3 97 In other instances, commentators
suggest that persons receiving ten percent of an issue might be considered
underwriters. 398  Another commentator concludes, after examining
Commission no-action letters, that a different test of underwriter status
applies to resales of securities acquired in section 3(a)(9) transactions.399
The Commission needs to develop a sensible and consistent approach
to resales generally and, as a part of that, to resales of Rule 145 stock. In
that regard this Article offers the following observations and suggestions.
First, there is no theoretical basis for treating resales differently merely
because they may or may not involve Rule 145 stock. The statute defines
an underwriter as one who purchases with a view to distribution,' and
the fact that the selling shareholder originally purchased securities in a
Rule 145 transaction is essentially irrelevant to the matter.
Second, in determining whether such reselling shareholders are under-
writers, it is appropriate for the Commission to rely upon traditional cri-
teria. Thus, the Commission should focus on the size of the
shareholder's purchase or proposed resale, the holding period and the
availability of information about the issuer.
Third, the Comission must take great care, if it chooses to address this
problem, to ensure a result that is balanced and to avoid its propensity
for overkill. The strong need for free transferability of stock in the hands
of shareholders, the registration requirements imposed on sales of securi-
ties by control persons401 and disclosure requirements of the antifraud
provisions4°2 make an expansive definition of underwriter inappropriate.
Finally, any change in the rules regarding resales should be promul-
gated clearly, intelligibly and accessibly. Presently, there is no clear
394. Id.
395. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987).
396. For the text of Rule 145(c), defining underwriter, see supra note 1.
397. See supra notes 307-12 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
399. See Hicks, Recapitalizations Under Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act of 1933, 61
Va. L. Rev. 1057, 1096-1106 (1975).
400. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1982).
401. Sales of securities held by control persons often are subject to the registration
provisions of the 1933 Act. See supra notes 372-75 and accompanying text. As a result,
such sales may involve disclosures by the selling shareholder either to meet the prospec-
tus delivery requirements, see 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1982), the requirements of an exemp-
tion, see supra notes 144-64 and accompanying text, or the antifraud provisions of the
1933 Act, see supra note 22. There is, therefore, less need for an expansive definition of
underwriter, since sales are often subject to other requirements that insure disclosure,
especially when sales by larger shareholders are involved.
402. See supra note 22.
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statement defining when one becomes an underwriter, and the multiple
no-action letters, rules and releases dealing with this matter are difficult
to find and often impossible to reconcile. Many of the problems with
Rule 145 are due, at least in part, to the Commission's excessive reliance
on no-action letters as the principal development vehicle for Rule 145.
The Commission has issued approximately seven hundred no-action let-
ters interpreting Rule 145. With such a volume of letters written over a
protracted period of time by various members of the staff with varying
abilities, views and available time, it is not surprising that inconsistent
interpretations have developed.
More importantly, however, by acting through no-action letters, the
Commission has eliminated much of the meaningful input it otherwise
might receive and decreased its accountability for bad decisions. For ex-
ample, had the one-percent rule been promulgated as an amendment to
Rule 145 and put out for comment, it surely would have drawn fire from
commentators. Certainly, someone would have argued that it made no
sense to impose such a constraint in addition to the already overly re-
strictive definition of underwriter in Rule 145(c).40 3 This input and pres-
sure for sensible decisions was lost when the Commission imposed the
one-percent rule through no-action letters.
There is also the question of administrative resource allocation. If one
assumes that each no-action letter required a total of twenty lawyer
hours to analyze the letter, communicate with the requesting counsel,
research the problem, draft a response, provide for review by the appro-
priate branch chief or other superior of the staff member in charge of the
matter, then the total Commission time on all Rule 145 no-action letters
would be approximately fourteen-thousand hours.' 4 If the average work
year is two-thousand hours," 5 the Commission has spent the equivalent
of seven years writing Rule 145 no-action letters. Even if each letter re-
quired only ten lawyer hours, which would mean that a mere three-and-
one-half lawyer years have been spent on the Rule, the quality of the
Rule is something less than one might expect.
The Commission can solve this problem by continuing to issue no-
action letters, but only on a selective basis. These letters are helpful to
persons with particular problems and are generally beneficial as an indi-
cation of Commission policy. The Commission should, however, limit
future no-action letters to instances that will provide new guidance and
should refuse to respond in instances where the attorneys involved
merely are seeking comfort for established theories or analyses. 40 6
403. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987); supra note 1 for text of Rule 145.
404. This represents 700 no-action letters at 20 hours per letter.
405. This represents 50 weeks per year at 40 hours per week.
406. It appears that the Commission is starting to refuse to issue no-action responses in
certain instances where the staff had previously responded. See, e.g., Lazard Freres Inst.
Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 26, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct
file) (request involving change-in-domicile exception); National Sec. Funds, SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (available June 23, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, NoAct file) (same).
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In addition, the Commission should rely more upon interpretative re-
leases and amendments to the Rule itself. This would permit more sys-
tematic revision and development of the Rule and would allow more
input from persons outside the Commission who deal with the Rule on a
continuing basis. It would also help resolve the interpretative inconsis-
tencies that develop when different staffmembers respond to no-action
inquiries and would force the Commission to test its new theories against
contrary opinion.
In summary, the current state of Rule 145 interpretation is confusing
and inconsistent. The Commission should remedy the situation by
amending the Rule to replace the absolute categories of sale and no-sale
transactions and, instead, define "sale" to include only a transaction that
results in a material change to the corporation or to the shareholders'
rights. The Commission also should develop a consistent approach for
dealing with resales. Specifically, it should use the same criteria for de-
fining underwriter for Rule 145 purposes as are used to define under-
writer in other contexts. Finally, future development of Rule 145 should
rely more on interpretive releases and amendments to the Rule itself and
less on no-action letters.
1987]

